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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46 U. S. ARMY

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

COORDINATION OF VARIOUS ARMS



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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
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BATTLE EXPERIENCES, COORDINATION OF VARIOUS ARMS

INTRODUCTION:

Successful employment of combined arms has been an outstanding accomplishment of American Forces throughout the course of the war. The VI (Army) Corps with three assault landings, Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France, to its credit, and 524 days of combat in Italy, France, Germany and Austria, has had considerable experience in the coordination of Ground, Naval and Air Forces directed towards the successful culmination of a military operation.

To illustrate the methods and techniques employed in effecting coordination, two operations, the MEURTHE RIVER crossing on 20 November 1944 and the Southern France Assault Landing on 15 August 1944 will be discussed in detail.

There was nothing new or startling in either operation. The MEURTHE RIVER Crossing was designed for surprise, deception and exploitation. Throughout the planning period all Staff Sections functioned normally and operated closely with their corresponding sections on the Division Staffs. The Southern France Landing might well be considered a model of command and staff coordination and illustrated clearly the results which can be obtained by experienced Ground, Naval and Air Force personnel working closely together towards the solution of a common problem.

MEURTHE RIVER CROSSING

1. SITUATION:

On 5 November 1944 the decision of the Seventh Army Commander to force a penetration of the Vosges Mountains, and destroy the enemy in the Army zone west of the Rhine River, was transmitted to the Commanding General VI Corps in a written directive. This directive announced the mission of VI Corps as follows:

a. Continue present operation. (Clearing enemy from zone west of Meurthe River.)

b. Not later than D plus 2 attack on axis St Die - Strasbourg.

c. Receive and introduce into combat the 100th Infantry Division and the 103rd Infantry Division upon arrival and attachment to VI Corps.

d. Relieve and move the 45th Infantry Division (191st Tank Battalion, 645th TD Battalion, 106th AAA (AW) Battalion attached) to the Epinal, BAINS LES BAINS Army Rest Center on or before 10 November. These units revert to Army Reserve on arrival in Army Rest Area.

XV Corps on VI Corps' left was assigned the mission of attacking on D-Day, capturing and securing Sarrebourg, forcing the Saverne Gap and exploiting to the east. II French Corps operating under the 1st French Army on VI Corps' right was to maintain pressure and conform to the forward progression of the VI Corps right flank.

Thus VI Corps found itself faced with the problem of forcing a crossing of the Meurthe River, penetrating the high Vosges passes and debouching on to the Alsace plain. Available to accomplish this mission were four Infantry Divisions, the 3d and 36th Infantry Divisions both of which had been in continuous combat since the assault landing in Southern France on the 15th of August, the 100th and 103d Infantry Divisions both of which had yet to receive their baptism of fire.

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Eight battalions of medium and heavy Artillery were operating under the command of the Corps Artillery Commander and two Engineer Combat Regiments, the 36th and 48th, were available for employment by the Corps Engineer. In addition, the Army Commander had indicated the possible attachment of a combat command from the newly arrived 14th Armored Division should the situation develop that its employment appeared to be feasable. The 36th Infantry Division with the 442d Regimental Combat Team attached was occupying a 35 mile front and in addition was strongly engaged on its' left in clearing the heavily forested and rugged Foret Domaniale de Champ northeast of St. Die. On 6 November the 100th Infantry Division commenced the relief of the 45th Infantry Division and on 10 November the 103d Infantry Division commenced relief of the two right regiments of the 3d Infantry Division, the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments.

2. TERRAIN:

Two pieces of high ground flanked and dominated the most likely crossing sights of the Meurthe River between St. Die and Raon L'Etape. One was the heavily wooded hill mass on the east side of the river north of Raon L'Etape and the other was the heavily wooded hill mass on the west side of the river southwest of St. Die. Both in the vicinity of Raon L'Etape and just west of St. Die the wooded area extended up to the banks of the Meurthe River. On the west side of the Meurthe, midway between Raon L'Etape and St. Die a low open cultivated area had been cut out of the forest. This area however was undulating and though seemingly exposed to observation from the high ground on the east side of the river did in fact afford considerable ground cover for Infantry troops, though very little in the way of flash defilade for artillery or concealed concentration areas for engineer equipment or transportation. Further east on the other side of Meurthe, the ground rose gradually into the roughest part of the Vosges Mountains culminating in the dominating mountain mass of Le Donan. The area was 75% wooded and the principle roads followed the stream beds.

Only secondary roads crossed the ridge lines and they were winding with the steep grades susceptible to blocking by demolition and abatis. The St. Die - Strasbourg road may be considered the parting line of the Vosges Mountains. The junction point of two ranges was found at the town of Saales, 12 miles from St. Die and the highest point on the St. Die - Strasbourg road. This area, known as the Saales Pass, was the easiest pass of the Vosges. Between St. Die and Raon L'Etape all roads leading to Strasbourg funneled into this pass.

The Meurthe River flowing from St. Die to Raon L'Etape normally averaged 50 - 60 feet wide at St. Die and 90 - 100 feet wide in the vicinity of Raon L'Etape. A period of continuous rainfall had swollen the Meurthe River to flood stage. At some points the river formed a wet gap of more than 350 feet. However, a period of it had an average depth of 3 feet which during heavy rains rose to 5 - 6 feet. The banks were generally suitable for the construction of military bridges throughout its length. The bed was formed of gravel. The flow varied from three miles per hour normally, to 6 - 7 miles per hour following heavy rains. Numerous streams flowed down from the high ground on either side, the principle one of which the Plaine River, drained the area south of the dominating Le Donan to the vicinity of Raon L'Etape. While the Meurthe River crossed the Corps zone of advance, most of the smaller streams paralleled the line of approach.

3. ENEMY SITUATION:

VI Corps was opposed by elements of the XLVII PZ Corps of the 5th PZ Army and the LXIV Corps of the 19th Army. In contact were 21 identified battalions and in reserve 19 battalions representing an effective combat strength of approximately 6,500. Since 15 October the enemy had fought a strong delaying action from the Mortange River to the Meurthe River defense line. His reaction to our attacks had been divided into three phases. First, a stubborn defense from dug-in positions which continued until the successful breach of his positions in the Bruyers - Belmont area by the surprise attack of the 3d Infantry Division. Second, a period of disorganization as a result of our breakthrough on the Brouvelieures -

Les Rouges Eaux axis during which our forces made substantial advances and captured many prisoners. And finally a strong delaying action made possible by the commitment of 10,000 reinforcements on the Corps front. The last phase showed the importance which the enemy attached to stopping the VI Corps advance and the threat that it posed to the Vosges defense line which he hoped to stabilize during the winter.

At present the enemy retained only a meager foothold west of this defensive position along the Meurthe River line. In the Corps zone its line remained generally Badonviller - Raon L'Etape - St. Die - Fraize - Gerardmer. With the exception of the area between St. Die and Fraize, were there had been considerable defensive work in the open terrain, the defenses had been generally concentrated on strong points covering the most favorable routes of advance through the Vosges Mountains, towards Strasbourg. This defense line had been under construction for sever al weeks, the enemy employing Organization Todt to supervise the work. In general the line consisted of extensive trench systems, pill boxes, wire, AT ditches and prepared gun emplacements.

4. FACTORS AFFECTING PLANNING:

The Corps Commander and staff were thus faced with two immediate problems. First, the planning and conduct of an operation that would place the Corps in a position to force a crossing of the Meurthe. Second, the planning and conducting of the river crossing operating itself prepared to exploit the success gained therefrom. Obviously, daily developments of the first operation would continuously influence the planning of the second.

Accordingly, Field Order Number 7 was issued on 7 November 1944. Briefly, the // conception of the maneuver directed in Field Order Number 7 was as follows: The zone of operation of the 3d Infantry Division was reduced to a regimental front, thus permitting the relief of two regiments for a period of rest and objective training in preparation for an assault crossing of the river, leaving to the other regiment the job of clearing enemy pockets in its zone East of the Meurthe and in position to conduct the reconnaissance and patrol actions necessary for the planning of an assault crossing. The 100th Infantry Division was to relieve the 45th Infantry Division as required by Army order, and in addition, from the Baccarat bridgehead to attack South along the East bank of the river to seize the dominating hill mass North of Raon L'Etape mentioned previously as one of the key terrain features affecting a Meurthe crossing to the South. The 103d Infantry Division was to clear the high ground Southwest of St. Die on the West side of the Meurthe River. Both the attacks of the 100th Infantry Division and the 103d Infantry Division were limited objective attacks which, it was felt, would introduce these division into combat without the shattering effect that too difficult a task might have on green troops. The zone of the 36th Infantry Division was reduced somewhat by the sandwiching in of the 103d Infantry Division. This division's combat efficiency had been materially reduced by the strenuous fighting and physical hardships it had undergone since its assault landing on the Southern beaches. Consequently it was assigned a holding mission accompanied by certain limited objective attacks and extensive patrolling designed to fix on that front the enemy troops now opposing the division.

Thus, it can be seen that the Corps was prepared for any of several eventualities. Should the attack of the 100th Infantry Division meet unexpected success, this success could be exploited by the 3d Infantry Division without an assault river crossing being necessary. Should the attack of the 103d Infantry Division succeed in achieving a breakthrough of the enemy lines West of the Meurthe it was conceivable that bridges in the St. Die area might be seized and a crossing affected without the necessity of conducting a full scale assault of the river line. Here too the 3d Infantry Division would be available for exploitation. In any event, the successful accomplishment of their mission by the 103d Infantry Division and the 100th Infantry Division would give the Corps command of the terrain necessary to proceed with its assault of the river line, and it was felt would draw enemy troops and attention away from the Clairrefontaine - St. Michel area where the assault crossing may be made. There was no doubt that these missions

would be accomplished because of the considerable superiority of men and materiel which were concentrated to do the job. Accordingly staff planning proceeded based on these concepts.

5. STAFF PROBLEMS:

a. Artillery

Selection and coordination of artillery position areas was a particular problem because of the limited suitable area available and the exposed nature of the terrain. Corps artillery, groups commanders and division artillery commanders carried out joint reconnaissance to insure equitable distribution and most advantageous positions for all types of weapons from 8" howitzers to multiple 50 caliber Anti-Aircraft half-tracks. In addition to normal 3d Division Artillery Battalions, 3 155 howitzer battalions, 1 155 gun battalion, 1 8" howitzer battery, a Tank Destroyer battalion and a battery of 90mm anti-aircraft guns were emplaced in the area of 3d Division making the main effort. This artillery area was no larger than that normally required for a division artillery. All movement had to be made at night and positions had to be prepared at night for about a week before the attack, making detailed coordination a prime requisite. Repeated staff visits and conferences on the ground was the only answer.

In addition to digging attack positions, dummy positions were prepared and registered from in the zone of the 100th Division. This phase was coordinated by group Commanding Officers and the Commanding General 100th Division Artillery.

Detailed target studies were started about a week before the contemplated attack date and were carried out simultaneously by corps and divisions with a mutual exchange of information. Based on these studies, Corps selected position areas, determined priority of targets and allotment of guns and ammunition to divisions. Conferences between between Corps and Division Artillery S-3's aided in completing detailed fire plans of divisions and upon their submission to corps, no-fire lines and schedules were coordinated and Corps Artillery S-2 checked the plans for completeness of coverage of enemy defenses. A fortunate last-minute set of aerial photos received by Corps Artillery S-2 gave several changes of location which were included in final fire plans.

Based on the indicated concentration of enemy batteries and other defenses, groups and battalion assignments were made according to Annex Number 3 to Field Order Number 8. The usual liaison (right to left) between Corps battalions and Division Artilleries was established. Terrain compartments and a poor roadnet made this particularly difficult, but a workable arrangement of lateral telephone lines solved the problem.

Coordination of movement was of particular importance in the 3d Division sector because only one poor road was available for movement of the division and supporting artillery. A shortage of corps artillery battalions made it necessary to leave in position until the last minute those battalions supporting attacks of the 100th Division and 103d Division, then moving the battalions to the 3d Division area for the main attack. Since the assault elements of the 3d Division were also moving to the area at the last possible minute, it was imperative that minute details of traffic control and schedules be worked out. Corps artillery battalions coordinated directly with division traffic control officers on this problem.

Field Artillery annex to the Corps Field Order was written by the artillery representative at Corps Headquarters, but staff visits had given divisional artillery and groups all the necessary information as to ammunition restrictions and organization for combat prior to the publishing of the order.

b. Air Support

Before discussing the details of air support planning, a brief outline of the organization of the air support teams working with the Corps is desirable.

Operating as part of the forward echelon of the Corps Headquarters was a team from the 64th Fighter Wing, XII TAC, consisting of a Controller Section and a Communications Section. The Controller Section was organized with three officers and two enlisted, the officers all having had combat experience in flying fighter-bomber missions. The Communications Section provided wier, radio, and switchboard facilities. In addition, a Radar section whose job it was to assist in the location and control of the incoming flights, operated in conjunction with the air support team. The team had its own direct telephone and radio communication to the 64th Fighter Wing, to Army Headquarters, to all divisions of the Corps, and was also in constant radio communication with every flight in the air in support of the Seventh Army. Each division had attached to it an air support team organized along similar lines but with fewer personnel and without the Radar Section. An interesting development, known as "EGGBASKET" had been made in the use of the Radar Section. When the fighter-bombers were unable to locate the desired target because of weather conditions or other reasons they were directed into enemy territory and controlled by the use of Radar to alarge pre-designated target such as extensive marshalling yards or other areas of military significance. When the Radar location determined them to be over the target, they were ordered through the air support team to drop their bombs and return home. This system, though admitedly inaccurate for precise b bombing, did save jettisoning of bombs in a helter-skelter manner.

Target studies covering all the enemy territory in front of the Corps were, of course, continuous based on photo interpretations, PW interrogations, artillery counter-battery reports, civilian reports and all other available sources of enemy information. With the planning of the Meurthe crossing as directed by the Corps Commander these studies were immediately intensified with the particular view of selecting those targets suitable for air bombardment which would most seriously effect the success of the crossing and its exploitation. In addition each division submitted daily a list of air targets with the attack priority indicated. These requests were consolidated and coordinated with G-2 Air for any additions or changes. Conferences were held between Corps and Army G-3 Airs and the Operations Officer of the XII TAC. Based upon the Corps Scheme of maneuver and the availability of aircraft, a plan for softening and diversionary bombardment and a plan for direct support bombardment once the crossing was under way was developed.

Three factors influenced the pre-crossing bombardment program; first, direct air support was necessary for the the 100th and 103d Divisions who would launch their attack prior to the 3d Division's assault crossing, second, an obvious pattern of bombing in front of the 3d Infantry Division would give an indication to the enemy that an assault crossing in that area was likely, thrid, a definite limitation on aircraft existed due to the necessity that XII TAC support with maximum aircraft XV Corps attack which was to commence two days prior to that of VI Corps. It was planned therefore, to intensify the close air support in front of the 100th Division, both to assist that attack and to create the impression of a main effort on that front. In addition deep targets on the front of the 3d Infantry Division would be attacked. Only on the afternoon prior to the crossing were the close in targets on the 3d Division's front to be attacked.

Methods of control of the close support aircraft had become standard in the Corps and were operating very successfully. No unusual system or specific planning was required in this respect. The most successful method of control was the use of the L-5 type aircraft in radio communication with the Corps and division controllers and flights in the air. This plane was known as "HORSEFLY". HORSEFLY would locate the target by air reconnaissance and call the controller who in turn would turn the next incoming flight over to HORSEFLY. The HORSEFLY pilot, who was also an experienced fighter-bomber pilot, together with his observer, a trained ground officer, would then brief the incoming flight in the air and lead them to the target. Where the location of the target was difficult, colored artillery smoke would be fired on the location. This was coordinated through the air support team and an artillery officer at Corps Headquarters. If a target of opportunity was located by a ground source its location was described through the air controller to the HORSEFLY in the air who would then attempt to locate it by air reconnaissance. In the event that HORSEFLY was not available the incoming fighter-bomber flights would be briefed in the air by the ground controller, and colored artillery smoke employed to assist in its location. This system however never proved as dependable as the HORSEFLY reconnaissance. In specific divisional targets, an incoming flight

and HORSEFLIGHT would be given over to the Division Controller who followed the same procedure as outlined.

It was standard practice with the Corps for the G-3 Air and a representative of the Corps Artillery Officer to work very closely together on plans for the employment of both air and artillery. They were established, in fact, in the same office. Targets were discussed and where possible were taken under artillery fire, thus releasing a fighter-bomber flight for a more suitable air target. In certain areas counter-flak programs were fired to assist fighter-bombers into a target with minimum interference. Through the close coordination of artillery and air representatives in the Corps Headquarters maximum assistance between artillery and air was effected and maximum efficiency of a target attack attained.

c. Engineer

Following the Corps crossing of the Moselle River in late September immediate steps were taken by the Corps Engineer to determine the exact nature of the Meurthe River, the next obstacle lying astride the Corps axis of advance. Information was obtained by contacts with the French authorities, namely the Department of "Ponts et Chaussees" and the Department of "Eau et Forets". From these sources and with excellent photographic coverage furnished by Seventh Army Photo Center a study was prepared and distributed to the Corps and Division Engineers detailing the dimensions of bridges, possible bridge sites, depth of water, anticipated velocities and nature of bed and banks. This study was distributed to troops during the last week of October. A second more complete study together with complete photo coverage of the Meurthe River from north of Bacarrat to south of St. Die was distributed to all division and Corps engineer battalions two weeks prior to the actual crossing.

During the staff planning phase of this operation a detailed terrain estimate with annotated maps was prepared and furnished to the Corps Staff.

Due to the flooded nature of the low lands bordering the river it became apparent that bridges must be constructed on or close by the existing structures which would be demolished as our attack got underway. The Corps Engineer decided that class 40 crossing must be constructed in the vicinity of Etival - Clairfontaine and St. Michel - Sur - Meurthe in order to open an Main Supply Route for each division once the bridgehead was established. Suitable bridging was also earmarked for possible use in the city of Raon L'Etape when the city was taken by the advance of the 100th Division from the Bacarrat bridgehead and for the opening of the Corps Main Supply Route through the city of St. Die.

As the Corps main effort was in the zones of the 3d and 103d Divisions, it was decided to place the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment less one company in support of these two divisions.

No attempt was made to attach the Corps engineers directly to either division as the engineer was bound by existing river conditions to construct crossings at definite sites on the river regardless of which division was concerned. Liaison officers from the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment were detailed to the Division Engineers of the 3d and 103d Divisions for the operation. The 48th Engineer Combat Battalion was directed to support the advance of the 36th Infantry Division with one company while the balance of the battalion was directed to open the Corps Main Supply Route through St. Die. A conference was called by the Corps Engineer of the various Division Engineers and the Battalion Commanders of the corps engineers. At his time the allotment of available bridging was made to the satisfaction of all concerned. The Corps Engineer stressed the necessity for not attaching Corps Engineer troops to divisions as there were definite on-the-ground jobs to be accomplished regardless of the tactical boundaries set up or the troops involved. As the main effort was in the vicinity of ETIVAL-CLAIRFONTAINE and ST. MICHEL-SUR-MEURTHE the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment of three battalions was assigned the mission of constructing crossings at these locations. The 48th Engineer Combat Battalion, was directed to open the Corps MSR through ST. DIE at the earliest possible moment. This crossing site was cleared by the flanking action of the main effort. Supporting the bridging operations were the 196th Engineer Dump Truck Company (Provisional Treadway Bridge Company) and Company C, 578th Engineer Separate Battalion (Provisional Bailey Bridge Company). These units were attached to the Combat Engineers as the anticipated missions required.

d. Armor

The Corps had on its troop list at this time two medium tank battalions and two self-propelled Tank Destroyer battalions. Consequently, to give each of the four Infantry divisions some accompanying direct support Armor it was necessary to break up the battalion organization by attaching separate tank and tank destroyer companies to the 100th and 103d Infantry Divisions. Experience had shown that the Infantry soldier fights with more assurance when the direct support of medium tanks is readily available to him. Consequently, it has been an habitual practice in the Corps to keep a tank and a tank destroyer battalion attached to an Infantry Division and even when necessary, to break up the battalion organization so that some tank support would everywhere be available to the assault Infantry. From the Corps point of view the probability of getting an armored combat command, however, made necessary the planning of its employment.

Terrain studies were made with a view for determining what ground in the Corps zone was suitable. The result of this study showed that the area immediately adjacent to the ridge line road between MOYENMOUTIER and SAALES was the only ground in which any large scale deployment of Armor could be effected and even in this area it was felt that the continued rains would probably have made the ground so boggy that it would not hold medium tanks. However, the rather expansive road net which existed SOUTH of the SAALES pass would permit the operation of many small armored task forces over a broad front.

Because of the generally unsuitable terrain conditions for employment of Armor in any mass the Corps Commander determined to use CCA only in the event that a complete breakthrough of the enemy positions was achieved and the operation took on the nature of a pursuit. Once a debouchment from the VOSGES was effected, the broad and undilating expanses of the ALSACE plain offered considerable promise for the employment of an armored combat command.

e. Intelligence

The first and a very important responsibility of G-2 during the planning phase of the Meurthe River crossing was to indoctrinate the intelligence staffs of the two new divisions on the importance of combat intelligence. The Corps G-2 instructed the new division staffs to report specifically what, when, where, and source of information. A brief general evaluation of information was encouraged as it was found that opportunities to evaluate information were often overlooked because of the mass of information available at division level which often times makes the enemy actions and intentions appear too obvious. An effort was made to discourage the useage, at regimental and battalion level, of such phrases as "stiff and heavy resistance", as relative terms fail to convey an accurate and true picture of the enemy activity. The new units were instructed to transmit by the most expeditious means, direct to the Corps G-3, flash reports of new identifications, movement of enemy reserves, locations of armored units and enemy air activity.

In conjunction with the Corps Engineer, a terrain study was prepared of the ST. DIE area to study the effect of terrain on our future operations. As a result of the terrain study the following points were brought to light:

(1) Concealment and Cover. The terrain afforded excellent cover for troops and vehicles. About 75% of the area was under forest. Fields of fire were extremely limited.

(2) Observation. Observation was very limited due to extensive forests. A local French report indicated an excellent enemy observation post at V-384622, overlooking the southern approach to ST. DIE.

(3) Obstacles. The Meurthe River and limited road net east and northeast of the Meurthe River canalized the movements of troops and vehicles.

(4) Critical Terrain Features.

a. Forest between Montagne and Meurthe Rivers.
b. High ground to the southwest and northeast of ST. DIE.
c. Pass at Col Du Saales.
d. Area of Col Du Donan.

(5) Tactical Effect of Terrain.

a. Ease with which enemy may select alternate defense lines, suitable for infiltration tactics and use of anti tank and anti personnel mines.

b. Advance restricted by the ease with which mountain roads can be defended.

c. Terrain affords relatively few Corps artillery position areas.

d. Terrain severely limits the use of armored force vehicles.

e. Limited road net requires detailed traffic control and supply planning at Corps level.

During the planning phase the Target Intelligence Section, consisting of Asst A C of S, G-2, G-2 Photo Interpreter, and an artillery intelligence officer processed all available intelligence on enemy supply installations, troop concentrations, movement of men and material, rail and road nets, artillery positions, and strong points in order to prepare target recommendations for the Corps artillery and G-3 (Air). To support the attack on D-Day, special emphasis was placed on the preparation of intelligence for close support bombing and artillery fire in the enemy's MLR. To provide maximum harassment of the enemy's MSR, the G-2 (Air) and G-3 (Air) coordinated the requests for visual tactical reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance. To supplement the tactical visual reconnaissance and to provide continuous surveillance of the target area, air artillery observers were employed to the maximum extent feasible without interference with artillery spotting missions, to observe and report enemy movements on the Corps front, with particular attention to road movements of motorized and mechanized forces.

f. Supply

During the planning phase there was sufficient time to complete the build up of Army dumps in the EPINAL area. Therefore, sufficient ammunition of all types was stocked in forward A.S.P.'s to allocate VI Corps enough for a 14 day offensive. The supply of 76mm gun ammo was built up in A.S.P.'s enough so that 17 M4A3 tanks with 76mm guns could be alloted to each tank Bn. This was the first time the M4A3 w/76mm gun had been used in VI Corps and gave the tank Bns considerably more punch. Track extenders to equip 50% of the tanks were alloted to each tank Bn. Corps sub-alloted the Army allocation to the divisions and Corps Arty, holding a Corps reserve to be used where needed to support the main effort wherever it developed. Plans were made whereby Army would establish advance truck-heads in the Rambervillers and St. Die areas as the situation developed.

The 3rd Division developed a plan to use tanks and TD's amphibiously. Sufficient shrouds and waterproofing material were procured to service 1 Company of each. Also 12 "Dukws" were used to mount AT Guns.

Due to the extremely difficult terrain ahead of the Corps, packboards were procured and issued on the basis of 500 to each division. Mules were also requested and a Qm Pack Train Co was made available for Corps use if needed.

Equipping the new units, the 100th and 103rd Divisions and CCA 14th Armored presented somewhat of a problem. The Infantry Divisions arrived in the Corps area short generators, lanterns, mine detectors, aiming posts and camouflage nets but were supplied from Army stocks before they were committed. Since the Combat Command did not have a truck company to assist in its supply, a platoon of a Corps truck company was attached. The Corps truck company was loaded with supplies, principally gasoline, and alerted to follow up the armored column if a break through was made.

Provisional Truck Companies were made up from the 3rd and 36th Divisions, Corps Arty and the AA Brigade. These were used as needed to assist in moving the 45th Division to the rest area and the two new Infantry Divisions to the assembly area from detraining points.

6. BRIEFING OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS

a. At a conference conducted by the Corps Headquarters at GRANDVILLIERS on the afternoon of 10 November 1944 the Corps Commander outlined to his Division Commanders the operations incident to the Corps mission. He presented three plans, all of which involved crossing of the MEURTHE River by the 3rd Infantry Division. Plans A and B called for the 3rd Infantry Division to cross the MEURTHE in the vicinity of ST MICHEL and to establish an initial bridge head on the East bank. In Plan A the 3rd Infantry

Division proceeded due East on the axis SAALES-SCHIRMECK-STRASBOURG with the 100th Infantry Division operating on its left and the 103d Infantry Division on its right following an administrative crossing behind the 3rd Infantry Division and subsequent passage through its right into the South and Southeast. In Plan B the missions of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 103d Infantry Division were interchanged after the establishment of the initial bridgehead by the 3d Infantry Division. Plan C called for the 3rd and 103d Infantry Divsions to cross the MEURTHE River abreast with the 3d Infantry Division on the left. The action of each division following establishment of the initial bridgehead conformed to the maneuver outline of Plan A. Of these plans the first was favored.

The Corps Commander at the time of his conference indicated that the probable date for the 3d Infantry Division crossing would be 20 November. This date was contingent upon the progress of the 100th Infantry Division in its action Southeast from BACCARAT, and of the progress of the 103d Infantry Division on the right of the 3d Infantry Division in seizing the high ground Southwest of ST DIE. Successful consummation of these operations would serve to draw enemy reserves from the front of the 3d Infantry Division thereby weakening the enemy in the zone of crossing. Orders for the execution of any one of the Corps outline plans were to be withheld pending success of the actions of the 100th Infantry Division and the 103d Infantry Division.

7. DEVELOPMENTS PERIOD 10 - 20 NOVEMBER

The period 10 to 20 November was utilized to set the stage for the assault crossing of the MEURTHE. The 100th Infantry Division shifted its weight from the West side of the river to the North into the BACCARAT bridgehead and commenced its attack South and parallel to the East Bank. This attack, though hampered by very difficult terrain and weather conditions, initially made good progress. The 103d Infantry Division completed its relief of the 3d Infantry Division elements and assumed command of its zone at 120900A. Preparation was immediately initiated for its limited objective attack to seize the high ground Southwest of ST DIE. The two relieved regiments of the 3d Infantry Division, the 7th and 30th, withdrew to training areas on the MEURTHE River, and commenced at once intensive objective training under conditions which would approximate those of the actual river crossing. At 160900A the 103d Infantry Division commenced its attack and by the 18th had seized its objective without great difficulty. The 36th Infantry Division continued its intensive patrol and small scale attack program throughout its front.

At 190600A CCA of the 14th Armored Division was attached to the Corps by Army. This unit commenced movement forward to a reserve assembly area on the 20th and arrived on their probale employment as an exploitation force. The movement of this large unit into the restricted forward area over the poor road net that existed caused an almost unsolvable traffic problem however, and created the only hitch in an almost perfectly executed operation.

The attack of the 100th Infantry Division was, of course, watched closely and with considerable interest by the Corps Commander. As has been pointed out if there should be any indication of a breakthrough or a large scale enemy withdrawal on this front, it would not be necessary for the 3d Infantry Division to make its assault crossing. By the 18th it looked as though, from the progress of the 100th Infantry Division, this may be possible and warning orders to that effect were issued to the 3d Infantry Division. However, between the 18th and 19th the attack of the 100th Infantry Division had been slowed down, and the 3d Infantry Division was directed on the morning of the 19th to continue with its preparation for an assault crossing. Field Order #8, issued the evening before, would stand. At 1300 on the 19th, a written Operations Instruction directing the 3d Infantry Division to attack at 200645 and carry out the provisions of Field Order #8 was issued.

An interesting development and one which considerable influenced the 3d Infantry Division's plan occured the evening of 18 November. The 15th Infantry succeeded in crossing by boat an Infantry platoon to the far bank in the zone of attack of the 7th Infantry. This platoon occupied a house immediately in the front of the enemy's main position without being detected. It reported its situation by radio that same night and was instructed to hold its position and to observe during daylight on the following day. The patrol rendered several reports during the course of the next day indicating that the enemy was holding his main position with light forces, all of whom appeared to be occupying buildings along the RAON L'ETAPE- ST DIE highway. On the night of the 19th the platoon was ordered to patrol to the river bank to the crossing area and to contact and orient the footbridge assault platoons when they arrived at the far bank. This operation was carried out with complete success and was instrumental in assisting the assault platoons in the accomplishment of their mission.

8. 3D INFANTRY DIVISION ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Commencing immediately after darkness on the evening of 19 November, the footbridge assault platoons crossed the MEURTHE River as planned, and by 2400A were in possession of an LD approximately 300 yds from the RAON L'ETAPE - ST DIE highway. Footbridges were installed with exceptional speed, being completed by approximately 2359A. Foot troops of the assault regiments proceeded from detrucking areas to the footbridges without incident. By 0600A all three battalions of the 30th Infantry and the two assault battalions of the 7th Infantry had crossed to the far bank and were poised on the LD without having been discovered. The reserve battalion of the 7th Infantry was held in concealed assembly area on the near bank prepared to cross on order. At 0615A, the fire preparation was initiated. The combined fire of Division and supporting Corps Arty, Tks, TD's, AA half tracks, chemical mortars, and organic infantry weapons placed a devastating concentration on the enemy's positions. This fire continued for 30 minutes shifting at 0645A to the flanks of the assault regiments and lifting to the enemy's rear areas. The infantry assault was launched simultaneously with the lifting of fires at 0645A. Opposition was moderate, and consisted mainly of S/A, MG and mortar fire. Extensive minefields that were encountered in front of the enemy's main positions inflicted approximately 150 casualties.

By 1200A, 20 November, the 7th Infantry had captured LA VOIVRE (V3871) and had pushed the advance 2,500 meters to the East thereof. During the same period the 30th Infantry captured LA HOLLANDE (V3772) and HIMBAUMONT (V3873), and was clearing the town of CLAIRFONTAINE (V3674). The 15th Infantry less the 1st Bn which was assembled in Division reserve at ST REMY (V3272), continued to occupy its positions along the river, and at noon received orders to assemble by battalion prior to crossing the footbridges.

The 36th Engr Combat Regiment initiated its preparations for the construction of heavy bridges at ST MICHEL and CLAIRFONTAINE shortly after daylight on 20 November. Their progress was stopped throughout the morning, however, by enemy mortar, MG, and self-propelled fire. Accordingly, orders were issued to the 3d Chemical Bn to employ its attached smoke generators from the 168th Chemical Co (SG) to smoke both bridge sites. Due to shifting winds, and difficulty in moving generators, the smoke coverage of the bridge sites was unsatisfactory. Smoke pots were next employed to influence the screen but were not entirely successful due to the fact that the areas in which it was necessary to situate them were under fire. Chemical mortars were finally employed to establish screens on the far bank and it was this method that proved most satisfactory during the course of the day of 20 November. During the night of 20-21 November, complete readjustments were made in the location of smoke generators and smoke pots with the result that on the morning of 21 November, smoke coverage of the entire river line was thoroughly satisfactory, and contributed directly to the timely completion of the heavy bridges.

At approximately noon on 20 November, Corps directed that two RCT's of 103d Infantry Division were to be crossed over 3d Infantry Division footbridges at the earliest possible moment, and following assembly on the far bank, were to pass through the right of the 3d Infantry Division and continue the attack to the SOUTHEAST. The 103d Infantry Division immediately contacted the 3d Infantry Division, and informed them that the two RCT's in question (409 and 410) were in assembly areas on the 3d Infantry Division's right rear in vicinity of the town of LA BOURGONCE (V525685). The 103d Infantry Division was requested to send its reconnaissance forward to the footbridges and to the CP's of the assault regiments of the 3d Infantry Division. The Asst Division Commander of the 3d Infantry Division was designated as coordinator of crossing and was stationed at the footbridge sites.

During the daylight hours of 20 November, the 103d Infantry Division commanders concerned completed reconnaissances of routes to footbridges, formulated plans for movement and crossing, and maintained close liaison with the assault regiments of the 3d Infantry Division for the purpose of locating assembly areas in the wake of the advance on the far side of the river.

During the night of 20-21 November, RCT's 409 and 410 crossed foot elements over the four footbridges of the 3d Infantry Division. Each RCT employed two footbridges. The crossing was effected without incident, and RCT's proceeded to respective assembly areas, RCT 409 assembling vicinity LA VOIVRE (V379710) and RCT 410 in vicinity of HIMBOUMONT (V380738). The crossing and assembly was accorded full assistance and planning.

At 0900 on 21 November, RCT's 409 and 410 initiated their attacks to the SOUTH EAST through the 2nd Bn of the 7th Infantry, which held the 7th Infantry Division's right flank. 3d Division Artillery rendered a preparation in advance of the jump-off.

By the late afternoon of 21 November, the attack of the 103d Infantry Division had progressed from 2 to 4 kms on its entire front. At 1430A on afternoon of 21 November, the 103d Infantry Division was given traffic priority over the ST MICHEL bridge. Upon completion of the crossing of the 103d Infantry Division tactical transportation, the passage phase as applied to the 3d Infantry Division was complete.

The 36th Engr C Regt, together with certain personnel of the 10th Engr C Bn, initiated reconnaissance of the four heavy bridge sites at daylight on 20 November. Reconnaissance of the two CLAIRFONTAINE sites was rendered impossible by S/A, mortar and SP fire from the town of CLAIRFONTAINE. At the two ST MICHEL sites, however, reconnaissance proceeded satisfactorily and by mid-morning, engineer materiel had been moved to the vicinity of the bridge sites. Work was initially concentrated on construction of a wide-track Armored Force treadway bridge in the vicinity of ST MICHEL. After initial progress the work was suspended for several hours due to accurate mortar and SP fire on the bridge site. Although efforts were made to smoke the sites by means of generators, smoke pots, and chemical mortars, shifting winds and the fact that the enemy had registered on the bridge sites, minimized the effect of the smoke.

By late afternoon of 20 November, the advance had progressed to such a depth that the enemy bringing fire to bear upon the bridge sites had been destroyed or forced to displace to the rear out of range. At darkness, therefore, work progressed in earnest and continued steadily through the night. The light assault bridge at the footbridge crossing area, which had been completed prior to daylight on the 20th, passed approximately 75 ½-ton loads prior to 2300A, at which time the approaches to the bridge were rendered impassable by rising water and mud. Had it not been for this bridge, the Division re-supply and emergency evacuation at the most critical time would have been imperiled. The traffic which was passed over this bridge consisted exclusively of Battalion transportation and medical vehicles, with the exception of a small number of command and communication vehicles. With daylight on 21 November, work on all four heavy bridge sites was intensified. By 0645A the wide-track Armored Force treadway bridge at the ST MICHEL site was completed and promptly passed 17 armored vehicles and about 20 other tactical vehicles. At this time one tank bogged down at the exit of the bridge due to flooding of the approach by rising water. The bridge was inoperative from this point on.

By 1000A the class "40" Bailey Bridge at the ST MICHEL site was completed and all the transportation scheduled for passage over that bridge, plus two platoons of tanks, one platoon of TD's, a mechanized reconnaissance platoon, and several engineer vehicles originally scheduled for the CLAIRFONTAINE bridges were crossed. At 1430A the use of the bridge was transferred to the 103d Infantry Division.

By 1530A, the main CLAIRFONTAINE bridge was completed for light traffic and became the 3d Infantry Division's main bridge. By 1630A, it was capable of passing class "40" loads. All of the traffic scheduled for the CLAIRFONTAINE bridge for D-Day was crossed by 2130A. The remaining heavy bridge site located just SOUTH of the main CLAIRFONTAINE bridge was completed for 2½-ton maximum loads during the night 21-22 November, and passed miscellaneous supply traffic only.

By daylight 22 November the Corps had the combat elements, Infantry, Artillery and attached Armor, of three divisions across the MEURTHE. Combat Command A, 14th Armored Division however, was detached from the Corps by Army and sent on another mission in XV Corps zone. The heavy weight of attack in this weakened center had apparently taken the enemy by complete surprise and extremely rapid progress was being made by the three divisions. Isolated centers of resistance were leap-frogged and cleared up well after the advance units had passed beyond them. The momentum of the Corps attack and its rapid progress forced the enemy to withdraw or be cut off completely. As it was, thousands of prisoners were taken from units which were by-passed and cut off before they realized it. By 26 November the 15th Infantry had seized MOLSHEIM, the last stumbling-block in a debouchment from the Vosges. By the 27th of November the Corps had reached the Rhine River and had turned the direction of its attack South along the ALSACE plain toward COLMAR.

9. CONCLUSION

a. Techniques Involved

(1) Staff Coordination.

Successful planning as brought out in this operation among many others, is directly dependent upon close association and mutual exchange of views not only among the staff sections of the headquarters involved, but also between corresponding staff sections of the next higher and lower headquarters. Ground reconnaissance by the commander and staff officers who are doing the

the planning, both on a division and Corps level, contributed materially to the soundness of the plan which was developed. Close personal contact between Corps and division commanders and between the heads of Corps staff sections and their corresponding number on the division staffs assured an exchange of views and information that left a clear and concise picture both as to the Corps Commander's intentions and what the divisions intended to do. It is recognized, of course, that this is simply correct staff procedure, but the failure to follow this procedure by various staffs is frequent and often times causes confusion and difficulties for subordinate units which are entirely unnecessary.

(2) Crossing By Stealth.

Probably the most unique feature of the entire operation was the method of executing the crossing of the MEURTHE River. The Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division, in evolving his own estimate of the situation, saw clearly the advantages to be gained by conducting the jump-off for the assault of the enemy's well-prepared line from an LD on the far side of the water barrier. Such a plan, if successful, obviated the dangers incident to the assault of the river line. Whereas it was true that the location of the enemy's defensive system favored such a plan, it is noteworthy that had the Division failed to exercise all reconnaissance available to ascertain the enemy's activity in front of his position along the far bank, the knowledge that the terrain immediately across the river was undefended and poorly outposted might never have come to light. The advantages of being able to undertake the assault after having crossed both assault regiments were not only strong moral factors, but contributed directly to the power of the attack. Likewise, the superb conduct of the crossing itself enabled the assault to be made with complete tactical surprise. The decision to use footbridges in place of boats involved the grave risk of confining the crossing to a narrow frontage, but this danger was more than offset by the speed and simplicity with which the crossing could be effected. The careful attention to detail which characterized the pre-crossing training program insured the workability of the plan.

(3) By-passing Technique.

From the experience of the divisions in the woods fighting that characterized the tedious advance to the MEURTHE River, it was decided by both the 3d and 103d Infantry Divisions, to employ by-passing techniques to as great a degree as possible as soon as the advance gained momentum from the initial bridgehead. Accordingly, the 7th Infantry by-passed the town of LA VOIVRE with its 3d Bn, and drove that battalion to a depth of 6 km to DENIPAIRE, during which time the other battalions of the regiment were engaged in LA VOIVRE and in the vicinity of HURBACHE. This advance was made cross-country and encountered no opposition. Its success was evidenced by the fact that once cut off from the rear, the enemy resistance in the 7th Infantry zone collapsed. During the conduct of the 7th Infantry drive to DENIPAIRE, the 30th Infantry pushed its 3d Battalion between engagements at LA HOLLANDE and CLAIREFONTAINE, and promptly seized HIMBAUMONT and LE PAIRE before the enemy was able to react. This action not only cut off the enemy's principal route of withdrawal from MOYENMOUTIER but gained the 3rd Infantry Division access to the vital ridge-line road leading EAST to SAALES. The technique indicated above was employed throughout the advance through the VOSGES with the most gratifying success. At NAYEMONT, where the 7th Infantry engaged a stubborn enemy in the town itself and was temporarily stopped, the 2nd Battalion was promptly pushed to the SOUTH of the town and EAST toward LA GRANDE, a distance of 2 km, thereby isolating the opposition and preventing what would have been a stubborn delaying action on the part of the NAYEMONT force to the EAST along the main road. The 3d Battalion subsequently by-passed the 2d Battalion and proceeded with unusual speed to LA GRANDE FOSSE and SAALES. The 15th Infantry, when committed at ROTHAU, promptly by-passed that town and seized SCHIRMECK. Here contact was gained with Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division, which was moving from the NORTH. Once again moderate opposition at the town was by-passed, and extremely rapid progress followed, culminating with the capture of MOLSHEIM. The 30th Infantry consistantly employed by-passing action with success in its push from RUSS to OBERNAI. The most significant result of the by-passing technique was to make rapid gains with few losses. The enemy was constantly kept off-balance, and was unable to make a determined stand at any point.

(4) Night Advance.

Following initial successes of the 7th and 30th Infantries in making deep thrusts into the enemy's position by by-passing resistance, the 3d Infantry

Division decided to capitalize on the enemy's obvious difficulty in countering this technique by requiring the assault regiments to carry on the daylight advance with two battalions, while one battalion was rested during the day in preparation for continuation of the advance at night. The regiments were required to establish a daylight objective line to which they would push by darkness. The fresh battalion would be moved forward by vehicle where practicable, and passed through on this line. The most outstanding example of the success of this plan may be found in the capture of SAALES. In this case, the fresh battalion of the 7th Infantry was passed through the 2d Bn at LA GRANDE FOSSE after darkness, and moved aggressively by infiltration into the town of SAALES. Although the German garrison of several hundred was present in the town, it was completely disorganized by the arrival of our forces, and elected to withdraw rather than to resist in the town or its near-by defenses. Had the enemy been permitted to man his SAALES works, a prolonged struggle most certainly would have resulted, since the position was one of the most formidable, and was designed to form the main-stay of an impregnable winter defensive line. In capturing MUTZIG and MOLSHEIM, the 15th Infantry employed the night advance technique outlined above, driving straight down the main road for a distance of 10km in one night. That the vigorous pressing of the advance by fresh troops at night offers unusual advantages in a fluid situation can best be expressed by pointing out that approximately 1/2 of the ground gained from the MEURTHE River to the RHINE River was gained by night operations.

b. Comparison With Other Operations and Lessons Learned.

It is not possible within the experience of VI Corps to point out a comparable operation to the MEURTHE River crossing that resulted in either partial success or failure. However, there are numerous instances in the conduct of the MEURTHE River operation that seriously influenced its success which may be worthy of discussion and lessons drawn therefrom.

Careful coordination by the Corps Artillery, including personal reconnaissances by the Corps Artillery Commander with his subordinate commanders and frequent staff visits to the division artillerys and the Corps Artillery group headquarters, assured a complete tie-in between all the guns of the Corps. The restricted position areas and the limited road net in the approaches to these position areas made the artillery problem a difficult one and one that was solved only by careful planning on the part of the Corps Artillery and close supervision of the execution of these plans to assure maximum artillery support of the Infantry at the time and place where it was needed.

Similarly only close coordination between Corps and division engineers, and careful supervision of the execution of their plans would assure the construction of the ST MICHEL and CLAIRFONTAINE bridges and the rapid support of the infantry foot elements by Armor and Light Artillery. Though it was the responsibility of the Corps to construct the two heavy bridges with Corps Engineer troops, it was necessary to obtain maximum assistance from the divisions in the nature of providing smoke screen coverage for the sites, counter-mortar and counter-battery fires, traffic clearances and local protection for the Engineer crews working at the sites. Rapid exchange of information on the situation between the Engineers and Infantry was also necessary to permit the bridges to be completed in the minimum time without over endangering the working crews.

One outstanding weakness in the Corps plan was the failure to provide for a carefully thought out traffic control plan and to supervise its execution. That great confusion and serious difficulty did not arise as a result was due primarily to the excellent plan which the 3d Infantry Division had set-up on its own and the work which their traffic control section did in supervising and handling Corps traffic in their zone. This weakness in the Corps staff organization was immediately corrected as a result of this experience by the formation of a Movements, Planning and Control Section operating generally under the supervision of the A C of S, G-3, but also working closely with the A C of S, G-4.

Though the Corps had lost its Armored combat command before their anticipated employment as an exploitation force the inadvisability of attempting to employ large armored formations in terrain not suitable for the purpose was once again forcefully brought to light. The difficulties experienced in attempting to concentrate this force over the limited road net available so congested these roads that the supply of the Corps was seriously jeopardized. Later, this force was committed not under Corps control along the very canalized road between CIREY and BIRONBACH to effect a juncture with VI Corps elements. Progress in this attack

was extremely slow since freedom of maneuver was denied by the terrain and since the unit was unable to deploy on any suitable front. Though the nature of the opposition was primarily road blocks and demolitions small enemy forces were able to hold up the entire combat command simply because it could not make full use of the weapons and tremendous fire power which it had at its disposal. In contrast, however, the small tank formations operating with the Infantry divisions were extremely useful in reducing centers of resistance which were holding up or delaying the advance.

SOUTHERN FRANCE ASSAULT LANDING

The landing by VI Corps on the southern coast of France on 15 August 1944 exemplified the successful coordination of the major Army ground arms with both Air and Naval forces. Major units involved included three American infantry divisions reinforced, and a combat command of the First French Armored Division, in cooperation with XII Tactical Air Command composed of 9 groups of fighters and fighter-bombers reinforced by heavy and medium bombers and 200 Navy carrier-based planes; naval surface forces included both transport and gunfire support vessels. In addition VI Corps was responsible for the subsequent passage through its lines of II French Corps which landed following D-Day over beaches secured by VI Corps.. Coordination was further complicated by the fact that units of the Corps were required to contact an Airborne Task Force which landed several miles inland early in the morning of D-Day, as well as other smaller units landing on the flanks of the main assault area.

1. SITUATION

Shortly after the relief of VI Corps Headquarters by IV Corps near CIVITI-VECCHIA, ITALY, on 11 June 1944, the Commanding General and General Staff Section Chiefs of VI Corps visited ALGIERS, NORTH AFRICA, where they were briefed on a forthcoming operation by the headquarters of Seventh Army (Force 163). A tentative Army outline plan was issued, providing for the assault of the southern coast of France to secure a beachhead EAST of TOULON, and the subsequent capture of that city and MARSEILLE, to be followed by exploitation to the NORTH. On the basis of the Army plan a tentative Corps outline plan was issued to divisions for planning purposes. Approximately 10 days later a second Army plan was received. After a second visit of the Corps Commander and General Staff to Seventh Army Headquarters a final Corps outline plan was issued on 15 July. Based on this outline plan, Corps Field Order Number 1 (ANVIL) was issued on 30 July. A copy of this Field Order is available in the files of the General Board, USFET.

In general, VI Corps was composed of the 3d, 45th and 36th Infantry Divisions reinforced, and Combat Command SUDRE of the First French Armored Division. All of the American divisions had had considerable experience in ITALY, where a great part of their time had been spent under the command of VI Corps. This force was to make the major assault landing on beaches between CAP CAVALAIRE and AGAY (See Operations Map, FO #1). In addition, the first Airborne Task Force under the command of Seventh Army was to land in the LE MUY area just prior to daybreak to prevent enemy movement into the beach area and to attack hostile artillery positions from the rear. This force was to be attached to VI Corps upon establishment of contact. Likewise, under Army command, the First Special Service Force was directed to assault the islands of PORT CROS and LEVANT on the SOUTHWEST side of the beach landing area during the night of D-1/D-Day, to eliminate enemy coastal batteries which threatened friendly shipping areas. A French Commando Groupe was assigned the mission by Army of landing near CAP NEGRE to destroy enemy coastal defenses and block the coastal highway at that point. On the NORTH flank of the landing area a small French naval assault group was to land near POINT DES TRAYAS and block the CANNES - ST RAPHAEL and CANNES - FREJUS highways. Following the securing of beaches in the assault area II French Corps was directed to debark rapidly and pass through elements of VI Corps and attack WEST toward TOULON. Eventually I French Corps was to arrive in Southern France to join II French Corps under the First French Army.

Enemy forces were expected to be able to organize fairly strong initial resistance, employing a force of at least one division. Photo reconnaissance and ground information indicated that fixed coastal guns, field artillery concentrations on beaches, and pillbox defenses might be expected. Both underwater and shore obstacles were observed on some beaches. Local counterattacks were expected during the first few days, but in view of the Allied invasion in NORMANDY and the activity of Allied

troops in ITALY it was not expected that the enemy could build up his troops sufficiently to mount a large scale counterattack. Maquis resistance groups in Southern and Central France also were a major factor in pinning down a number of divisions which might otherwise have been moved to the Southern France beaches. The enemy was believed incapable of any serious interference with the landing by his air or naval forces. It seem probable that a tenacious defense of the port of TOULON was the most likely enemy line of action.

Terrain in the landing area generally consisted of low mountains a short distance behind the beaches, although small plains were found locally. The mountain ridges were cut by numerous ravines running from the foothills of the Alps to the coast. It was expected that the enemy would have good observation initially on all landing beaches. This would be eliminated, however, once the high ground behind the beaches was taken. The advance of invading troops appeared to be somewhat canalized by the hill masses, and indications were that considerable delay might result from road demolitions.

Because of the number of troops directly under control of the VI Corps, the number and diverse character of other assault units with whom contact would have to be made and which were to be attached to Corps upon contact, as well as the fact that support was to be rendered by air and naval forces, the coordination required of the Corps Commander, who was directly in command of the assault, was highly complex. The purpose of this study is to examine the means of coordinating the activities of the units involved in this operation.

2. METHODS OF COORDINATION IN PLANNING

a. Planning Headquarters.

A great deal of the efficiency of planning by the various echelons must be attributed to the physical set-up which housed the Corps planning syndicate. After the first visit of the Corps Commander to ALGIERS the Corps Chief of Staff and Headquarters Commandant proceeded to NAPLES, ITALY, and selected a large, though obsolescent, Italian barracks in the downtown part of the city which had been used as a day leave center by American troops. This building proved highly satisfactory from the standpoint of security and was adequate in size to handle the planning personnel of VI Corps Headquarters, the three divisions, Corps Artillery and each naval subtask force supporting the three divisions. The physical presence within a single building of all planning syndicates permitted a rapid and thorough interchange of thought which greatly expedited the solution of the numberous questions which arise in the planning phase of a large scale military operation. Seventh Army Headquarters also arrived in NAPLES about two weeks after the Corps, and the Naval Task Force Commander and his staff followed about two weeks later. These two commands established separate headquarters.

b. Security

Every officer and enlisted man, including army, navy and air corps personnel engaged in the planning of the Southern France operation was responsible for strict observance of individual security discipline in his own activities and among all others with whom he came in contact. The area in which planning was in progress was declared a RESTRICTED AREA and the entrance was gained only through a BLUE BUILDING PASS approved by A C of S, G-2. Officers and enlisted men of planning sections were classified either XO or YO depending on the nature of their work, and classified personnel was held to a minimum consistent with efficient planning. To ppovide additional security in the headquarters, a Security Officer was named by each section who was directly responsible to the A C of S, G-2, for the strict observance of all security directives.

Throughout the planning phase it was realized that it was impossible to conceal the fact that certain troops were undergoing amphibious training; however, all preparations for the mounting of the operation were implemented in such a way that the following four factors would not be revealed to, and could not be deduced by, either the enemy, the civilian population or our own forces aprt from those whose duties required such knowledge:

(1) Objective
(2) Date
(3) Strength and Order of Battle of our Forces
(4) Tactical Methods to be Employed

From captured documents taken after the fall of ROME, it was evident that the operational security of seasoned troops was unsatisfactory. During the Italian campaign it was estimated that the Germans received about 70% of all correct information

of our own forces from radio intercept, 20% from prisoners of war and 10% from captured documents. After consulting with G-3 and Signal Officer, the A C of S, G-2, prepared a training memorandum for unit training during the planning stage stressing such measures as radio discipline, handling of classified documents, statements of prisoners of war, telephone security and rumors and loose talk.

c. Naval Coordination

(1) Craft Characteristics. As was to be expected, the problem of coordination with naval forces was a major one from the outset. In this connection it should be noted that there was no naval planning headquarters on the Corps level, the Western Naval Task Force Commander dealing on a level with the Seventh Army Commander. An example of a specific problem lay in the requirement by the naval task force commander that all XAPs (Personnel transport ships) move together in one convoy, and that those ships carrying personnel of each division break away from the main convoy only after daylight of D-Day. H-Hour had been set for approximately three hours after daylight and it was estimated that the minimum time between split-up of the XAP convoy and the time small craft could discharge personnel on the beach after divisional XAPs had gone to their respective areas and sent boats to the shore, would be four hours. Thus, personnel carried aboard XAPs would be available only for reserve use. Numerous conferences were held on this question, but the plan of allowing ships with divisional personnel to go with division convoys of other types of ships was consistently vetoed. However, late in the planning phase of the operation the Navy estimated that it would be able to deploy the ships from a central convoy into division areas in time to permit the small craft from the ships to participate in the assault at H-Hour. This decision altered the plan of assault considerably inasmuch as all three divisions were thus enabled to carry three additional battalions for the assault in XAPs.

Another problem arose due to the characteristics of LSTs. Certain of these ships are equipped with six davits for lowering boats while others are equipped with only two. The former are suitable for landing assault personnel on the basis of five LSTs (with approximately 25 LCVPs) per assault battalion, whereas the 2-davit ships are suitable for vehicles and non-assault personnel only. A further problem in this connection lay in the number of pontons carried by the LSTs. The 3d Infantry Division was allocated two 2-davit type ships carrying two pontoons. It was estimated however that nine pontoons were required on two of the division's beaches. On the other hand the 45th and 36th Infantry Divisions each were allotted seven 2-davit type LSTs carrying 14 pontoons, which were more than their requirements. Solution of this problem was met by having certain of the 45th Infantry Division's LSTs and certain ships carrying Air Corps radio equipment drop pontoons on 3d Infantry Division's beaches.

Difference in the characteristics of LCTs was a further difficulty. Only the short model LCT, equipped with a ramp estension, could accommodate the launching of DD Tanks and special tanks equipped for Engineer gapping work. It was necessary, therefore, to provide each division with sufficient short craft for loading its planned DD Tanks and Engineer gapping teams. This also was managed by conference with naval resprsentatives.

(2) Craft Allocation

A continuing problem in amphibious operations lies in the impossibility of obtaining a firm allocation of landing craft until relatively late in the planning phase. In this instance the original tentative Army allocation had provided sixty 6-davit LSTs for VI Corps, which were sub-divided equally among the three divisions. Later, the total number was reduced to 50, which in turn were reallocated on the basis of 20 to the 3d Infantry Division and 15 to each of the other divisions, with obvious major alterations being required in the loading and landing plans of the latter two divisions.

(3) Naval Gunfire

Coordination of plans for Naval Gunfire Support (Annex 3, FO #1) was effected by the Army Artillery Section. The Corps Artillery staff worked closely with the latter, as well as with Corps G-2 and the Corps G-3 (Air), in compiling its requests. Obviously, first priority targets were selected by the Navy, which was required to protect its ships from enemy coastal battery fire if troops were to be carried into the transport discharging area. Other targets were enemy guns and defenses which could interfere with the landing and advance of troops, and, after H-hour, targets of opportunity developed by Shore Fire Control Parties and air spotters. Within divisions, nine Shore Fire Control Parties were set up, four from organic personnel and five attached from Army troops.

d. Use of Air

(1) Bombardment

In planning the air strike to be effected by XII TAC in cooperation with the landing (Annex 2, FO #1), it was impossible to determine the strength of the air force which would be available on D-day until approximately the 1st of August, although early indications were received that strong air forces would be available. The Corps insisted upon a major part in the preparation of the D-day bombing program, although the air planning headquarters was on an Army rather than a Corps level. The air program prior to D-day, which included attacks on enemy air fordes, road and rail lines and enemy coastal defense batteries over a wide area, as well as the execution of a cover plan involving attacks from ILE DU LEVANT to MARSEILLE, was left to Seventh Army, the Navy and the Air Forces. In the Corps preparation of D-day requests, data, including photos, were obtained for each possible target. Conferences with artillery and naval gunfire staff officers as well as with Air Force staff indicated which targets could most profitably be handled by the air. These targets were submitted in groups arranged by priority. In addition, Corps required a phasing of the air effort throughout the day. In general, a heavy effort was desired from first light until approximately H-hour on any enemy artillery which could be fired into the shipping area. Obviously, the selection of targets for this effort was coordinated with the Navy. This phase also included a considerable effort on beach obstacles, pillboxes and strong points defending the beaches. Shortly prior to H-hour, bombing ceased in order to assist observation of naval gunfire. Counter-battery attacks against coast defense guns and against enemy artillery capable of firing on the beaches continued after H-hour, and at 1230B heavy bombardment was resumed on the main FREJUS beach where a regiment of the 36th Infantry Division was scheduled to land at 1400B. Following this effort, major attention was requested on armed reconnaissance to attack enemy movements into the assault area. In this connection two Restriction Lines were designated beyond which armed reconnaissance could operate at will and within which air-briefed missions of the gravest importance or pre-briefed missions accepted by the Air Corps were permitted. The first of these lines was effective at H-Hour and the second at H plus 6.

Reports from the NORMANDY invasion activated the Corps to request relatively light-weight bombs for use on beach defenses in order to prevent the creation of large craters along landing areas. Plans called for the use of fragmentation and 100-lb bombs to clear wire and other light obstacles. Allocation of effort to the various beaches was made on the ratio of 40 heavy bombers of 120 mediums for each 1000 yards of beach. Other major targets for these planes were bridges well inland. Attacks on artillery positions and strong points were executed by fighter-bombers.

After D-Day, the air program against bridges in the RHONE Valley continued briefly, but the rapid advance of the Corps units soon rendered useless the daily submission of pre-arranged targets. Maximum effort in the formef armed reconnaissance along routes NORTH from the landing area was requested and coordination of effort with the Air Force took the form of nightly resumes of the Corps' intentions for the following day, submitted to XII TAC through Army Air Support Control. The principal problem during this phase was communications, between Corps and Army, and between TAC Advance Headquarters (located usually adjacent to Army) and its units, due to the great distances covered by ground forces.

(2) Photo Coverage

The photo planning of the Southern France operation began in February 1944 when a few odd sorties were flown along the coast of Southern France between MARSEILLE and NICE. Although the coverage was incomplete, these photos later proved invaluable for comparative cover. In the second week of February one American and one British Photo Squadron initiated a flying program which included about 3 sorties per day covering the coast line to a depth of about one mile and the islands lying off the coast. Shortly after, the program was expanded to include road and rail nets going NORTH from the coast line, airdromes and scattered block coverage about 10 to 15 miles inland. As more photo reconnaissance planes became available in SARDINIA, two strips along the coast were flown daily plus block coverage to a depth of 15 miles. In April the coverage included the area up the RHONE Valley paying particular attention to the activities and defenses of airdromes. Early in the summer approximately two sorties daily were flown of the coast line between the

Spanish border and MARSEILLE.

Throughout the period of planning, the photo coverage was used to prepare and maintain up to date collation maps of the target area. Photo interpretations covered coastal defenses paying particular attention to dual purpose batteries. Beaches also received daily attention recording the defensive activities of mine fields, pill boxes, wire, tank obstacles, strong points, under water obstacles, and artillery positions capable of firing on the beaches. As a result of the well-organized photo planning by higher intelligence staffs and the execution of photo reconnaissance by the air corps, the following photo distribution was made available to all Infantry Divisions;

a. 1:10,000 annotated photo mosaics of the beaches were issued to all assault units including infantry, tank and TD platoons and artillery battalions. Annotations included defenses, beach names, towns, roads and rivers, and other general geographical features.

b. 1:25,000 photo mosaics. These mosaics corresponded to the 1:25,000 map sheets and were issued on the same basis as a. above. The issue covered a depth of 15 miles to infantry units and about 25 miles to artillery, tank, TD and Reconnaissance units.

c. Obliques of the coast line were issued to all assault units on the same basis as a. above. These obliques were annotated with beach names and prominent land features.

d. Steric cover 12" (1:25,000 scale) were furnished to all assault units to a depth of 10 to 15 miles.

e. Use of Armor

In order to provide a mobile striking force, Combat Command SUDRE of the First French Armored Division was set-up as a part of VI Corps. About three weeks after the opening of the Corps planning syndicate the Commanding General and the S-3 of the Combat Command reported from ORAN, NORTH AFRICA, for discussion of their participation. The S-3 remained in NAPLES for several days, completing and receiving approval of his loading plan and becoming thoroughly familiar with Corps plans in general and possibilities for use of the Combat Command in particular. Plans called for this unit to be held in reserve initially, prepared to land over secure beaches as directed, beginning D Day. Shortly after the visit of General Sudre, the Corps Commander and some of his staff flew to NORTH AFRICA and inspected the command. In the development of the operation, General Sudre's force was not called upon to take a front line part prior to the time it reverted to its own division control under Seventh Army. (See Incls 14)

f. Use of Artillery

Employment of artillery with the Corps did not present any unexpected problems. Initially almost all Corps Artillery was divided among three divisions in order to reinforce their organic fires as early as possible. In anticipation of an early junction between the 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions an armored field artillery group headquarters under Corps Artillery control was designated to assume command of Corps Artillery Battalions with the two divisions on Corps Artillery order in the event this seemed practical before Corps Artillery was prepared to reassume command of battalions attached to all three divisions. One reconnaissance party of the 2nd Field Artillery Observation Battalion was attached to each division, and as indicated above 5 non-organic Shore Fire Control Parties for adjusting naval gun fire were attached to each division.

g. Supply

Upon receipt of the administrative plan to accompany the Anvil outline plan, issued by Task Force 163, the staff made a complete study of the phased maintenance as set up through D plus 30. Based on experience of previous operations, recommendations were made to change the ration set up decreasing the number of hard rations and increasing types "B", "X", and supplements thereto.

Assault packs were set up for the D, D plus 4, D plus 6, D plus 10 convoys. Previous experience with assault packs revealed that many items were never used. The special pack containing critical items of individual clothing were believed to be the most practical. Recommendations were made to delete the assault packs and ask for an increase in the special pack.

The individual reserve to be carried by the individual was set up to be issued prior to embarkation. This was changed and the reserve was loaded on board ship under the control of the Transport Quartermaster. Issue was to be made just prior to debarkation. This prevented items being consumed or lost during the voyage.

All units, upon coming under Corps control, were given a priority number as set up by Army for re-equipping and filling all T/E shortages.

A Chief Transport Quartermaster was designated to supervise all Transport Quartermaster's and coordinate all prestowage plans with P.B.S. The Chief Transport Quartermaster selected Transport Quartermasters from Corps troops and issued prestowage forms to all units.

The Divisions organized a similar set up designating a Chief Transport Quartermaster within the division. Complete instructions were prepared and distributed to be used as a guide for all Transport Quartermasters.

Waterproofing instructions were issued, stressing the importance of complete maintenance and prewaterproofing work to be completed prior to entry into the waterproofing area. Cadres from each unit were sent to the Invasion Training Center Waterproofing School. These students ran subsequent schools in the unit areas.

Waterproofing areas were selected -- the divisions waterproofing initially in their own areas and doing the final waterproofing in final staging areas near the docks. A special area was selected for Corps troops due to the large number of small units involved. These units were scheduled into the area for complete waterproofing. Technical assistance teams, to supervise all waterproofing, were made up from Corps and P.B.S. ordnance troops.

Plans were made to mount one battalion of 105mm Howitzer per division in Dukws. This necessitated a modification on each Dukw and the building of "A" frames and gun slings. Devices to "tie down" 105 Howitzer, so it could be fired while mounted in the Dukw, were procured and installed. The Dukw was to act as a prime mover for the Howitzer after landing until the regular prime mover could be unloaded.

Due to limited port facilities the loading of all craft and ships had to be made in three flights. One division was loaded on each flight withCorps troops spread along with all three flights. In order to check and control all phases of waterproofing and loading, each division was required to submit a schedule of events. A master chart showing the schedule of events for all Corps troops and divisions was made up. A staff officer was designated to check each day to determine if the schedule was being maintained.

A shore engineer Regiment was attached to each division. Attached to each regiment were sufficient service troops to unload the ships on each beach, establish and operate all dumps, de-waterproofing areas, and traffic control.

A careful study was made to determine if sufficient service troops were being mounted by each task force to support the operation. A smiilar study was made on transportation, combat vehicles versus cargo carrying vehicles. After prestowage had been completed, it was found that a large number of 2-1/2 ton trucks could be loaded on Liberty Ships, empty, as "light lifts". This was done and paid dividends in the rapid advance from the beaches of Southern France where cargo carrying vehicles were badly needed.

Development of planning produced various problems arising between the three assault divisions. Changes in the tactical landing plans left two beaches suitable for maintenance in the zone of the 3d Infantry Division while none remained in the proposed zone of the 45th Infantry Division. This problem was resolved after conference by providing for the landing of the beach group of the reserve RCT of the 45th Infantry Division over one of the 3d Infantry Division's beaches after it had been secured by the latter. A portion of this beach was then to be developed as a maintenance beach for the 45th Infantry Division vehicles and supplies, and an administrative boundary provided a road exit from the beach for the 45th. Similiarly, careful study indicated one of the proposed 36th Infantry Division's assault beaches

to be very heavily defended and to present a serious threat to the success of the dividon's mission. In this case it was decided to delay the assault of one RCT against this beach until the other two RCTs of the division, landing further to the NORTHEAST, could assist in reducing the beach defenses by attack from the land, and until the 45th Infantry Division was in position to assist from the SOUTH. In all cases where decisions of this kind were made the presence of planning personnel of all units in one building was of immeasurable assistance in expediting solutions.

h. Liaison. A highly important arrangement in the preparation for this operation was the provision of liaison between units. In addition to normal liaison between the three assault divisions arrangements were made by Corps as follows: (1) Exchange of liaison officers with Combat Command SUDRE; (2) Exchange with II French Corps: (3) Exchange with Seventh Army (Corps sent 2 officers); (4) Exchange between 3d Infantry Division and French Groupe de Commandos (Artillery liaison primarily the duty of 3d Infantry Division officer); (5) Exchange between 45th Infantry Division and 36th Infantry Division on one hand and Airborne Task Force on the other; (6) Liaison officer from 2nd British Parachute Brigade to 36th Infantry Division; (7) Artillery observation parties of 2d British Parachute Brigade tied in with 36th Division Artillery; (8) Corps radio command net tie-in with Airborne Task Force; (9) Radio tie-in of Airborne Task Force with 45th Infantry Division and 36th Infantry Division Artilleries; (10) Liaison officer from French Naval Assault Party with flank battalion of the 36th Infantry Division; (11) Liaison officers from Combat Command SUDRE with 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions; (12) Liaison officer and MP detail from Combat Command SUDRE with beach group over which Combat Command SUDRE would land in first priority; (13) Liaison officer from Airborne Task Force with Corps.

In addition, the Corps Commander sent an officer to function as his personal representative with each of the division commanders. These officers were briefed by General Truscott personally and proceeded aboard the division commanders' ships. Each officer was equipped with a vehicular SCR 193 and reported into a special net.

To coordinate the landing and passage of II French Corps, a control headquarters composed of two officers from Seventh Army, a VI Corps officer and an officer from II French Corps was provided. This control group was directed to assemble at the Corps CP on D-day and set up a seperate headquarters on D + 1, to execute the Corps responsibility for passage through its lines of II French Corps.

5. CONCLUSION

a. Recommendations

As indicated earlier an advantageous circumstance in the planning of the Southern France landing was the provision of a unified planning syndicate representing the division staffs as well as the Corps. Further assisting in this instance was the breakdown of the Corps and division staffs into planning and operating divisions. In the case of the Corps planning staff, the G-2, G-3 and G-4 Sections were represented almost in their entirety to assist the Corps Commander and the Corps Chief of Staff. A small part of the Corps Artillery Headquarters sufficed to constitute a planning staff. With G-3, the Signal Section and the Corps AAA Brigade maintained planning representatives, and the Engineer, Ordance Officer, Quartermaster and Surgeon assisted the G-4 Section with permanent representatives. The division planning staffs were constituted in a roughly similar manner. With a relatively small group of planning personnel concentrated in one area it is believed that planning was able to progress with maximum informality and efficiency.

Adequate provisions for liaison also contributed materially to the successful coordination of this operation. Obviously in the initial stages of the execution of an amphibious operation communications are complicated and difficult to maintain. In this case, however, provision was made for adequate officer personnel to provide for the maximum interchange of information.

Detailed planning with units supporting and cooperating with ground units is essential. In this instance, naval gun fire and Air Force personnel were willing and able to assist with material support, but they had to become fully conversant with the intentions and the desires of ground troops by means of constant personal contact. Only by intimate knowledge of joint plans can proper priorities be placed on the attack of desired targets in the required amount of effort by supporting forces.

b. Comparison with Similar Operation

The American landing on the North Coast of Africa, though not a failure, did illustrate numerous instances of violation of basic principals in the planning and

conduct of an amphibious operation. For purposes of contrast with the Southern France landing some of the violations of amphibious principals due to faulty technique and improper training are as follows:

(1) Failure of coordination in planning. All planning headquarters in this operation were set up at widely separated points. Army and Navy headquarters were separately established. Such a physical arrangement naturally made only for misinterpretations, loss of time in settling joint problems, development of misunderstandings between the services, and eventual lack of coordination which was most dangerous to the successful consummation of the operation.

(2) Faulty loading of vessels made necessary by improper order of arrival of cargoes at the port. In some instances it was necessary to deck load certain low priority Army and Air Force equipment on top of combat loads of assault Infantry Battalions because this equipment made its appearance too late for readjustment of ship loading.

(3) Lack of combined training between the individuals who were actually going to do the job. Some ships that were scheduled to carry Infantry assault units arrived too late to participate full-scale in a rehearsal for the landing. In addition, key personnel such as Army Transport Quartermasters and Navy small boat coxswains were not fully trained.

(4) Faulty coordination of naval gunfire support due to faulty communications and lack of experience by both Army and Navy personnel.

(5) Improper amphibious equipment. Without question, the great strides which were made in the design and construction of amphibious craft between the periods of the North African landing and the Southern France landing materially effected the smooth unloading in Southern France as contrasted to the unsurmountable difficulties encountered in North Africa. Likewise, advances made in communications equipment, notably the SCR 300 radio, greatly simplified the problem of control and coordination once the ground units were ashore.

(6) Faulty organization and lack of training of shore engineers. The development of a technique of shore engineer operation plus the wealth of experience on the part of shore engineer personnel served to form an unbelievable contrast between the beach operations during the two landings.

Copy No_____

Ref No X-1169

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO 758

[redacted]
SECRET
Auth: C[redacted] Army
Initials _____
Date: [redacted] Nov 1944

5 November 1944

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : Commanding General, VI Corps
Commanding General, XV Corps.

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1. Seventh Army attacks on D Day; destroys enemy in zone West of the RHINE; captures STRASBOURG and maintains contact with right (South) flank of Twelfth Army Group.

2. a. Boundaries: See letter, this Headquarters, dated 25 October 1944, subject: "Directive; General Plan for Future Operations".

b. D Day, H Hour later.

3. a. VI Corps:

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Not later than D + 2, attack on the axis: (ST DIE - STRASBOURG).

(3) Receive and introduce into combat the 100th Inf Div and the 103d Inf Div, upon arrival and attachment to VI Corps.

(4) Relieve and move the 45th Inf Div (with 191st Tk Bn, 645th TD Bn and 106th AAA AW Bn attached) to the EPINAL - BAINS LES BAINS Army rest area on or before 10 November. These units revert to Army reserve on arrival in rest areas.

b. XV Corps:

(1) Maintain active and close contact with enemy in zone.

(2) Attack on D Day; capture and secure SARREBOURG; thereafter force SAVERNE GAP, and be prepared to exploit East of the VOSGES.

(3) Be prepared to employ the 45th Inf Div, Reinf, when released by this Headquarters.

c. Troops:

(1) Field Artillery:

(a) The following units are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and are attached to XV Corps effective as indicated:

17 FA Bn (155 How), 0600A, 7 November 1944
976 FA Bn (155 Gun), 0600A, 7 November 1944
59 Armd FA Bn, 0600A, 9 November 1944.

Movement of units by direct arrangement between CG VI Corps and CG XV Corps.

(b) The following units, on arrival in Army area, are attached to XV Corps:

939 FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
698 FA Bn (240mm How) (- Det Btry B, 575 FA Bn (8" Gun)).

Exact time and place of arrival later.

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[redacted]

(2) Chemical:

CG VI Corps will release 83rd Chemical Bn (less Co B) for attachment to XV Corps after arrival in Corps area of 99th Chem Bn. Exact time and place of arrival later.

d. Air Support:

(1) Preparatory phase: No change.

(2) Operational Phase: Augmented air forces will give maximum close support to ground force actions, through present existing agencies. It will also be prepared to interdict enemy movements.

x. All units will make [redacted] effort to capture RR and highway bridges and tunnels intact.

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4. Administration:

For administrative details see Administrative Order No 12, dated 1 Nov and letter this Headquarters dated 4 Nov, subject: "Ammunition Allocation".

By Command of Lieutenant General PATCH:

A. A. WHITE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

JOHN S. GUTHRIE,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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XII TAC	30 - 33
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AG (Extra copies)	40 - 45

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ANNEX No 2
to
FO No 7

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

See current G-2 Periodic Reports.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Will the enemy defend:

(1) The heights LE COURS MT (V-3255) [redacted] (V-2913)?
(2) The hill mass S of ST DIE?
(3) The high ground N of RAON L'ETAPE (V-3479)?

If so, in what strength?

b. What reserves or reinforcements, infantry and armor, can be committed against our front? Where are they located? How will they be employed? To reinforce units in contact? Or to counterattack?

c. Where are the enemy's main artillery position areas? Strength of each area?

d. Has the enemy withdrawn the bulk of his forces from the Corps S flank? If so, to what general area?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Seventh Army

(1) Visual missions

(a) Surveillance of rail and road nets in following priority:

(1) Rail and road nets leading toward ST DIE (V-4265) from the NE and E.
(2) Road nets leading toward RAON L'ETAPE (V-3479) -- BACCARAT (V-2684) area from N and NE.
(3) Road nets N from MS from GERARDMER (V-3641).
(4) Rail movements in the RHINE Valley.

(b) Maintain surveillance of areas:

(1) S MOYENMOUTIER (V-3776) -- ST DIE (V-4265) -- SAALES (V-5372) -- MOUSSEY (V-4781).
(2) PEXONNE (V-3587) -- CIREY (V-4298) -- BLAMONT (V-3499) -- MONYIGNY (V-3191).
(3) FRAIZE (V-4554) -- LAVELINE (V-3161) -- ST DIE (V-4265).

Particular attention to enemy concentration areas and artillery position areas.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) Photo Missions

(a) Daily PRU coverage across Corps front to a depth of 10 miles, weather permitting.

(b) Tac/R pinpoints and strips in accordance with daily requests (Division requests for visual and photo missions to be made through Corps G-2)

b. 100th Inf Div

(1) Aggressive reconnaissance in zone as directed by division CG, particular attention N flank and toward CELLES SUR PLAINE (V-4284).

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c. 3d Inf Div and 103d Inf Div

(1) Aggressive reconnaissance immediate fronts as directed by Division Commanders.

d. 36th Inf Div

(1) Aggressive reconnaissance to the E as directed by Division Commander, particular attention to determine immediately indications of withdrawals.

e. Artillery Air OPs

(1) Air artillery observers of both Corps and Division Artillery will be employed to the maximum extent feasible without interference with artillery spotting missions to observe and report enemy movements on Corps front with particular attention to road movements motorized and mechanized forces. Missions for Corps planes will be prescribed daily. Sectors and periods of observation will be coordinated by the Corps Artillery Officer to insure continuous observation of main road nets on immediate Corps front.

4. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL

a. Operations

(1) Units will confine interrogation of Prisoners of War to those subjects which are of direct tactical concern to their particular echelon and Prisoners of War will be held only so long as is absolutely necessary to accomplish this brief interrogation.

(2) Interrogation of civilians and Allied personnel who have escaped from the enemy will be accomplished promptly and reported in the same way as for Prisoners of War, with appropriate modifications.

(3) German Air Corps Prisoners of War

(a) German Air Corps Flying Personnel will be interrogated by no one, except air interrogators.

(b) Captured German Air Corps Personnel (Flying Personnel only) and their equipment will be reported to G-2 Hq VI Corps. Specially trained air interrogators will be dispatched immediately to the place of confinement.

(4) Prisoner of War Reports will be submitted in Triplicate daily to G-2, Hq VI Corps as follows:

(a) Numbers and identifications of officer and enlusted Prisoners of War arranged by units down to enemy Bns.

(b) Prisoner of War Interrogations.

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[redacted]

b. Captured Documents

(1) Captured documents will be forwarded to G-2, Hq VI Corps, by fastest available means, being retained by divisions and other subordinate units only long enough to extract information of immediate tactical value to the unit concerned.

(2) Personnel will be thoroughly instructed on proper handling of documents and the need for sending back immediately even the most insignificant pieces of paper which often contain valuable information. Retention of any documents as souvenirs is prohibited.

c. Captured Materiel

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(1) Enemy materiel will be turned over by capturing unit to service concerned for initial examination. Brief reports of initial examination will be forwarded through Intelligence Channels.

(2) Evacuation will be made through Service Channels with the least practicable delay.

(3) Special reports concerning crashed enemy aircraft will be forwarded immediately through Intelligence Channels to G-2, VI Corps. These reports will give location, and time of crash, together with such other pertinent data as are available. Guards will be mounted by the nearest army unit on all crashed Allied or enemy aircraft without delay pending arrival of Technical Intelligence Officer (air).

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FM 30-25)

a. Counter espionage and Countersabotage

(1) Policy

(a) Counterintelligence and security measures will be imposed swiftly in order to suppress covert activities.

(2) Capture of enemy agents

(a) In order to prevent sabotage, espionage and other subversive activities, enemy agents and sympathizers will be captured as soon as possible. They will be confined, guarded and segregated from all other prisoners of war. Their headquarters, offices, quarters and all places used in connection with their activities will be searched for documents, ciphers, codes, wireless apparatus, and other matter containing and/ or pertaining to military information. These will probably be carefully concealed necessitating thorough search. Where possible, the aid of Allied sympathizers will be solicited in connection with the search.

(1) Enemy sympathizers. This personnel will be detained until interrogation or other evidence proves them harmless. Such interrogation will be conducted by security personnel who have complete authority to order their release or detention.

(b) SM/SA/CIC personnel, assisted where necessary by suitable parties of combat troops, will be utilized to effect the capture of the known enemy agents sympathizers and documents.

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SM/SA/CIC will initiate necessary measures to establish road blocks at strategic points throughout the Corps zone so that civilians can be screened to facilitate the detention and capture of enemy agents.

b. Counterintelligence Agencies

(1) The freedom of movement of counterintelligence personnel when on assigned missions will not be hindered at any time of day or night by the military police or other military agencies.

(2) As the agents of their respective Commanding Generals, full power of arrest is vested in the personnel of the Counterintelligence Corps, Securite Militaire, and Surete Aux Armees.

c. Camouflage and Concealment

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(1) Maximum use of natural cover and concealment will be exercised at all times.

(2) Natural cover will be supplemented by artificial means and camouflage and light discipline strictly enforced.

(3) Crowding on the march, at halt and in bivouac will be avoided.

(4) No uncovered or wood fires are authorized unless, when overcast makes flying impossible, a well defiladed location is selected to prevent ground observation.

d. Security

(1) Prior to engagement, troops will be reminded, if captured, to give only name, rank, and serial number, and refrain from disclosing any information during captivity which might be transmitted to the enemy by listening devices or agents disguised as Allied soldiers.

(2) Corps documents will not be carried forward of next lower echelon. No documents relative to current operations will be taken to forward positions except those that are absolutely essential to the efficient conduct of the operation. Arrangements will be made for the destruction of all non-essential documents. It is of the utmost importance that all documents liable to capture by the enemy are reduced to a minimum both as regards number, size and scope and all possible steps will be taken to this end.

(3) Loss, capture or compromise of classified documents, codes, and ciphers will be reported immediately to A C of S, G-2, VI Corps.

(4) Diaries and personal letters will not be carried on the person or in combat vehicles. Note: Diaries are not authorized in this Theater of Operations.

e. Civilian Control

(1) All civilians found attempting to cross our lines will be apprehended and held in custody until released by proper authority. Those civilians who are found attempting to cross our lines to the enemy will be treated as civil prisoners and espionage suspects until their innocence has been established.

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f. Reports

(1) Spot reports of sabotage, espionage, or subversion will be made by most expeditious means through intelligence channels to A C of S, G-2, VI Corps. These will consist of reports of the arrest of important enemy agents, cases of sabotage either successful or merely attempted, description of any newly discovered or unknown sabotage devices, or any other matters of sufficient importance likely to effect the immediate success of our operations.

6. DAILY PERIODIC REPORTS

a. To VI Corps

(1) Thrice daily as of 0600A, 1200A and 1800A, divisions and separate units will telephone or otherwise forward by most expeditious means available direct to A C of S, G-2, VI Corps (Redwood 2) a summary of enemy information for the preceding period. This summary will follow generally the outline covered by G-2 Periodic Report and must include specifically What, When, Where, and source of information, in addition to brief general evaluation of enemy activities.

(2) A full G-2 Periodic Report as of 2400A for the preceding 24 hours will be submitted daily so as to reach the A C of S, G-2, VI Corps by 1200A. Reports will follow Form 16, page 114, FM [illegible] paramount consideration will be given to evaluated intelligence under each sub-paragraph; overlays will accompany report when practicable.

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(3) Spot Reports. Flash reports on the following will be submitted by the most expeditious means direct to A C of S, G-2, VI Corps:

(a) New identifications including locations and spot IPW reports.
(b) Location of enemy parachute or airborne troops.
(c) Movement of enemy reserves.
(d) Armored forces.
(e) Counterattacks.
(f) Enemy air activity, giving location and time.

b. Reports from VI Corps

(1) Intelligence Summaries will be issued by G-2, VI Corps as of 0600A, 1200A and 1800A.

(2) Weather reports, including long-range and daily forecasts, will be disseminated by G-2 as available.

(3) A G-2 Periodic Report as of 2400A for the preceding 24 hours will be published daily.

BROOKS
MAJ GEN

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Langevin
LANGEVIN
G-2

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

SECRET
By authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials
7 Nov 44

VI Corps
GRANDVILLERS (V2060), FRANCE
7 November 1944

ANNEX NO 3
To
FO 7

AIR PLAN

1. Close Support:

a. Attack close-in targets using WP and Arty smoke shells on request from Divs.

DECLASSIFIED

(1) 7 Nov to 13 Nov:

Priority to 100th Inf Div.

(2) 13 Nov to 15 Nov:

Priority to 36th Inf Div. Targets as submitted by 36th Inf Div no later than 121500A.

b. Close-in support intensified to assist clearing of area W MEURTHE River.

c. Aircraft available for targets of opportunity on call.

2. General Support:

a. From 7 Nov to 20 Nov: Fighter-bomber attacks on following:

Priority	Tgt Description	Coordinates
1	RR Bridge	V731914
2	Rail Cut	V739650
3	Rail Cut	V606600
4	CP	V482632
5	Ration Dump	V534688
6	Ammo Dump	V455640
7	Ration Dump	V566692
8	Road Cut	V488408
9	Road Cut	V469405
10	Ration Dump	V6184
11	Ration Dump	V6892
12	Gun Position	V448649
13	Barracks	V428648
14	Ration Dump	V4363

b. Armed Recn to be requested on following routes:

Roads - GERARDMER - GRANGES
GERARDMER - CORCIEUX
GERARDMER - ST DIE
COLMAR - ST DIE
STRASBOURG - ST DIE
SELESTAT - ST MARIE - ST DIE
SELESTAT - SAALES - ST DIE

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VI Corps
GRANDVILLIERS, FRANCE
100900A November 44

OUTLINE PLAN "A"

Maps: France 1/100,000

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1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports.
   b. (1) Seventh Army attacks D day, captures Army in zone W of the MEUSE, and captures STRASBOURG (W0190).
   (2) XV Corps attacks D day; captures and secures SARREBOURG (Q5015), forces SARRE Gap prepared to exploit E of VOSGES.
   (3) II Fr Corps: Maintains present positions. Maintains contact with VI Corps on L.
   (4) XII TAC, see Annex 4, Air Plan (Omitted)

2. VI Corps attacks on the axis ST DIE (V4165) - STRASBOURG (Opn Overlay).

3. a. 100th Inf Div, atchds:

   117th Cav Ron Sq
   Co A, 1 Plat Co D 753d Tk Bn
   Co B, 1 Ron Plat 636th TD Bn
   83d Cml Bn (- Cos B, D)

   (1) Be prepared to attack on Corps order by 15 Nov, seize high ground E of RAON L'ETAPE (V3378) (Opn Overlay), and advance to E on axis MOYENMOUTIER (V3975) - ST BLAISE LA ROCHE (V5778).
   (2) Protect Corps L (N) flank.
   (3) Maintain contact with XV Corps L.

   b. 3d Inf Div, atchds:

   756th TI Bn (- Co C)
   601st TD Bn (- Co C)
   3d Cml Bn (- Cos B,C)

   (1) Be prepared to attack on Corps order by 20 Nov, seize bridgehead across MEURTHE R(Opn Overlay).
   (2) On Corps order seize high ground NE of ST DIE prepared to continue advance to NE on axis SAALES (V5372) - STRASBOURG.

   c. 103d Inf Div, atchds:

   Co C 756th Tk Bn
   Co C 601st TD Bn
   Co B 3d Cml Bn

   (1) Be prepared to cross MEURTHE R and seize line ANOULD (V4254) - FRAIZE (V4554) - RAON LA VEILLE (V5060). Subsequent to advance to the NE, protect the Corps R (N) flank (Opn Overlay). Coordinate with 36th Inf Div.

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   d. 36th Inf Div, atchds:

   753d Tk Bn (- Co A, 1 Plat Co D)
   636th TD Bn (- Co B, 1 Ron Plat)
   Co C 3d Cml Bn
   Co D 83d Cml Bn

   (1) On Corps order relieve 103d Inf Div in zone W of MEURTHE R.
   (2) Continue aggressive action and block on the line MEURTHE R - ANOULD - CHRAIRUPT (V3641).
   (3) Maintain contact with adjacent elements on R.
   (4) Protect Corps R (S) flank.

[redacted]

e. Corps Artillery: Annex 2, Arty.
f. 35th AAA Brig: Annex 3, AAA.
g. 1st Armd Gp: Continue present mission.
h. Corps Engrs:

36th Engr C Regt
48th Engr C Bn

(1) Support the crossing and advance of Corps.
(2) Bridging equipment as follows available for bridges at sites vic HOYENMOUTIER and ST MICHEL (V3870).
(a) One inf assault bridge and/or one 240' M2 Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 3d Inf Div.
(b) One 90' fixed M1 Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 36th Inf Div.
(c) One inf assault bridge and/or one 240' M1 Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 103d Inf Div.
(d) One 130' D/D Bailey bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 3d, 36th, 100th, and 103d Inf Divs.
(e) Inf support equipment will be provided to Div Engrs in the zone of attack of 3d, and 103d Inf Divs.
(3) Corps Engrs will relieve Div Engrs of maintenance of MSR as far forward as situation permits.

x. Attachments effective on date to be announced.

4. Administration: No change.

5. a. Axis of Sig Com:
(1) VI Corps - Opn Overlay.
(2) Divisions - Axis of attack.
b. CPs - Opn Overlay.

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4 ANNEXES - 1 - Opn Overlay
2 - Arty
3 - AAA
4 - Air Plan

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OVERLAY TO ACC'Y
OUTLINE PLAN "A"
MAP 1/100,000 FR

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10 Nov 44

VI Corps
GRANDVILLERS (V2060) FRANCE
100800A Nov 44

OUTLINE PLAN "B"

Map: France 1/100,000

DECLASSIFIED

1. a. See current G-2 periodic reports.
   b. (1) Seventh Army attacks D day; destroys enemy in [redacted] and captures STRASBOURG (WO198).
   (2) XV Corps attacks D day; captures and secures SARREBOURG ([redacted]) forces SAVERNE Gap prepared to exploit E of VOSGES.
   (3) II Fr Corps: Maintains present positions, maintains contact with VI Corps on L.
   (4) XII TAC, See Annex 4, Air Plan (Omitted).

2. VI Corps attacks on the axis ST DIE (V4165) - STRASBOURG (Opn Overlay).

3. a. 100th Inf Div, atchd:

117th Cav Ren Sq
Co A, 1 Plat Co D 753d Tk Bn
Co B, 1 Ren Plat 636th TD Bn
83rd Cml Bn (- Cos B, D)

(1) Be prepared to attack on Corps order by 15 Nov, seize the high ground E of RAON L'ETAPE (V3378) and advance to E on axis MOYENMOUTIER (V3975) - ST BLAIS LA ROCHE (V5778).
(2) Protect Corps L (N) flank.
(3) Maintain contact with XV Corps on L.

b. 3d Inf Div, atchd:

756th Tk Bn (- Co C)
601st TD Bn (- Co C)
3d Cml Bn (-Co B)

(1) Be prepared to cross MEURTHE R, and attack NE on axis SAALES (V5372) - STRASBOURG.

d. 36th Inf Div, atchd:

753d Tk Bn (-Co A, 1 Plat Co D)
636th TD Bn (-Co B, 1 Ren Plat)
Co C 3d Cml Bn
Co D 83d Cml Bn

(1) On Corps order relieve 103d Inf Div in zone S of MEURTHE R.
(2) Continue aggressive action to assemble and block on the line MEURTHE R - ARNOULD - GERARDMER (V5141).
(3) Protect Corps R (E) flank.

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(4) Maintain contact with adjacent elements on R.

e. Corps Artillery, Annex 2, Arty.
f. 35th AAA Brig, Annex 3, AAA.
g. 1st Armd Gp: Continue present mission.
h. Corps Engrs:

36th Engr C Regt
48th Engr C Bn

(1) Support the crossing and advance of Corps.
(2) Bridging equipment as follows available for bridges at sites Vic MOYENMOUTIER and ST MICHEL (V3870
(a) One inf assault bridge and/or one 240' Ml Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 3d Inf Div.
(b) One 90' fixed Ml Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 36th Inf Div.
(c) One inf assault bridge and/or one 240' Ml Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 103d Inf Div.
(d) One 130' D/D Bailey bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 3d, 36th, 100th, and 103d Inf Divs.
(e) Inf support equipment will be provided to Div Engrs in the zone of attack of 3d and 103d Inf Divs.
(3) Corps Engrs will relieve Div Engrs of maintenance of MSR as far forward as situation permits.

x. Attachments effective on date to be announced.

4. Administration: No change.

5. a. Axis of Sig Com:
(1) VI Corps - Opn Overlay.
(2) Divisions - Axis of attack.
b. CPs - Opn overlay.

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4 ANNEXES: 1 - Opn Overlay.
2 - Arty
3 - AAA
4 - Air Plan

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OVERLAY TO ACCY
OUTLINE PLAN "B"
MAP 1/100,000 FD
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

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10 No[redacted] 44

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060) FRANCE
100600A November 1944

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OUTLINE PLAN "C"

MAP: FRANCE 1/100,000

1. a. See current G-2 Periodic Reports.
   b. (1) 7th Army attacks D-Day; destroys enemy in zone W of the RHINE, and captures [redacted] (WC198).
   (2) XV Corps attacks D-Day; captures and secures SARREBOURG (Q5015), forces SAVERNE GAP prepared to exploit S of [redacted]
   (3) II Fr Corps: Maintains [redacted] maintains contact with VI Corps on L.
   (4) XII TAC, see Annex 4, Air Plan

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2. VI Corps attacks on the axis ST DIE (V4165) - STRASBOURG (Opn Overlay).

3. a. 100th Inf Div, atchd:

117th Cav Rcn Sq
Co A, 1 Plat Co D 753d Tk Bn
Co B, 1 Rcn Plat 636th TD Bn
83d Cml Bn (-Cos B, D)

(1) Be prepared to attack on Corps order by 15 Nov, seize the high ground E of RAON L'ETAPE (V3378) and advance to E on axis MOYENMOUTIER (V3975) - ST BLAISE LA ROUCHE (V5778).
(2) Protect Corps L (N) flank.
(3) Maintain contact with XV Corps on L.

b. 3d Inf Div, atchd:

756th Tk Bn (-Co C)
601st TD Bn (-Co C)
3d Cml Bn (-Cos B, C)

(1) Be prepared to attack on Corps order by 20 Nov, seize bridgehead in zone across MEURTHE RIVER (Opn Overlay).
(2) On Corps order seize high ground N of SAALES (V5372) and continue adv on axis SAALES - STRASBOURG.

c. 103d Inf Div, atchd:

Co C 756th Tk Bn
Co C [redacted] TD Bn
Co B 3d Cml Bn

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(1) Hold line W of MEURTHE RIVER in zone with minimum forces.
(2) Be prepared to attack on Corps order 20 Nov, seize bridgehead across MEURTHE RIVER (Opn Overlay).
(3) Seize high ground NE of ST DIE, capture ST DIE, advance to SE and seize line ARNOULD (V4254) - FRAIZE (V4554) - BAN DE LAVELINE (V5060), thereafter to advance to NE, protect the Corps R (E) flank (Opn overlay). Coordinate with 36th Inf Div.

d. 36th Inf Div, atchd:

753d Tk Bn (-Co A, 1 plat Co D)
636th TD Bn (-Co B, 1 Rcn Plat)
Co C 3d Cml Bn
Co D 83d Cml Bn

[redacted]

[redacted]

(1) Continue aggressive action to establish and block on the line MEURTHE RIVER - ANOULD - GERARDMER (V3641).
(2) Protect Corps R (S) flank.
(3) Maintain contact with adjacent elements on R.

e. Corps Artillery, Annex 2 Arty.
f. 35th AAA Brig, Annex 3 AAA.
g. 1st Armd Gp: Continue present mission.
h. Corps Engrs:

36th Engr C Regt
48th Engr C Bn

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(1) Support the crossing and advance of Corps.
(2) Bridging equipment as listed annex 1 for bridges at sites vicinity MOYENMOUTIER and ST MICHEL SUR MEURTHE.
(a) One inf assault bridge and/or one 240' M1 Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of the 3d Inf Div.
(b) One 90' fixed M1 Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 36th Inf Div.
(c) One inf assault bridge and/or one 240' M1 Treadway bridge will be provided in the zone of the 103rd Inf Div attack.
(d) One 130' D/D Baily Bridge will be provided in the zone of attack of 3d, 36th, 100th and 103d Inf Divs.
(e) Inf support equipment will be provided to Div Engrs in the zone of attack of 3d and 103d Inf Divs
(3) Corps Engrs will relieve Div Engrs of maint of MSR as far fwd as situation permits.

x. Attachments effective on date to be announced.

4. Administration: No change.

5. a. Axis of Sig Comm:
(1) VI Corps - Opn overlay.
(2) Division - Axis of attack.
b. CPs - Opn overlay.

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4 ANNEXES: 1 - Opn overlay
2 - Arty
3 - AAA
4 - Air Plan

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OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
OUTLINE PLAN "C"
MAP FRANCE
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By Authority of
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18 Nov 44

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060), FRANCE
181800A November 1944

FO 8

MAP: FRANCE 1/100,000

1. a. Intelligence: Annex 2.
   b. (1) Seventh Army continues attack; destroys enemy in zone W of the RHINE, and captures STRASBOURG (W0198).
   (2) XV Corps continues attack; captures and secures SARREBOURG (Q5015), forces SAVERNE Gap, prepared to exploit E of VOSGES.
   (3) II Fr Corps maintains pressure. Conforms to forward progression of VI Corps R flank. Maintains contact with VI Corps on L.
   (4) XII TAC: See Annex 3, Air Plan.

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2. VI Corps continue attack on the axis ST DIE (V4165) - STRASBOURG (Opns Overlay)

3. a. 100th Inf Div, atchd:

117th Cav Recn Sq
Co A, 1 Plat Co D 753d Tk Bn
Co B, 1 Plat Recn Co 636th TD Bn
83d Cml Bn (-Co's B, D)

(1) Continue attack to seize line AB (Opn Overlay). Advance to E on axis MORMOUTIER (V3975) - CHAMPENAY (V5479).
(2) Protect Corps L (N) flank.
(3) Maintain contact with XV Corps on L.

   b. 3d Inf Div, atchd:

756th Tk Bn (- Co B)
601st TD Bn (- Co C)
3d Cml Bn (- Cos B, C)

(1) Hold line W of MEURTHE R in zone with minimum forces.
(2) Assemble 2 Inf Regts by 200600A Nov in area indicated (Opn Overlay).
(3) Attack on Corps order, thru elements 100th Inf Div in zone. Advance to NE on axis SAALES (V5372) - STRASBOURG. (Opn Overlay)

   c. 103d Inf Div, atchd:

Co B 756th Tk Bn
Co C 601st TD Bn
Cos B, C 3d Cml Bn

(1) Hold line W of MEURTHE R in zone with minimum forces.
(2) Assemble 2 Inf Regts on Corps order in area indicated (Opn Overlay).
(3) Attack on Corps order, seize high ground NE of ST DIE, capture ST DIE advance to SE and seize line ANOULD (V4254) - FRAIZE (V4554) - BAN DE LAVELINE (V5060) (Opn Overlay). Coordinate with 36th Inf Div.

   d. 36th Inf Div, atchd:

753d Tk Bn (- Co A, 1 Plat Co D)
636th TD Bn (- Co B, 1 Plat Recn Co)
Co D 83d Cml Bn

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(1) Continue aggressive action and block on the line ANOULD - GERARDMER (V3641).
(2) On Corps order relieve 103d Inf Div in zone.
(3) Maintain contact with adjacent elements on R.
(4) Protect Corps R (S) flank.

   e. 14th Armd Div (upon release by Seventh Army):
(1) Assemble in area indicated on Corps order.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) On Corps order, pass thru 100th Inf Div and 3d Inf Div, attack in multiple columns on the axis ST MICHEL (V3769) - STRASBOURG and seize objective indicated.

(3) Coordinate with Divs passed thru.

f. Corps Arty: Annex 3, Arty.

g. 35th AAA Brig: Annex 4, AAA.

h. 1st Armd Gp: Continue present mission.

i. Corps Engrs: Annex 5.

x. (1) Attachments effective at once.

(2) Only minimum essential combat transportation will be moved E of MEURTHE R for 24 hour period after leading elements of divisions cross. Bridge priority (initially):

BACCARAT - 100th Inf Div
RAON L'ETAPE - 3d Inf Div
CLAIREFONTAINE - 103d Inf Div

(3) Infantry divisions will be prepared to motorize one CT on 2 hrs notice.

4. Administration: See AO No 1 this Hq, 9 Nov 44.

5. a. Axis of Sig Com:

(1) VI Corps - Opn Overlay.

(2) Divisions - Axis of attack.

b. CPs - Opn Overlay.

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6 ANNEXES: 1 - Opn Overlay
2 - Intelligence
3 - Arty
4 - AAA
5 - Engr (to be issued later)
6 - Air (to be issued later)
7 - Operation "THUNDER" (Special Dist)

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

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ANNEX No 2
to
FO No 8

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Auth: CG VI Corps
Initials:
Date: 8 Nov 44

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V-2060) FRANCE
181800A November 1944

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Maps: [illegible] 4471, 1/50,000

1. [illegible] OF ENEMY SITUATION

See current G-2 Periodic Report.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Will enemy attempt to defend along a general line:

(1) CLAIREFONTAINE (V-3674) -- MOYENMOUTIER (V-3976) -- SENONES (V-4477) -- CELLES SUR PLAINE (V-4284).

(2) MT D'ORMONT (V-4768) -- Hill 627 (V-4572) -- Hill 696 (V-4675) -- Hill 730 (V-4780).

If so, in what strength?

b. How and where will the enemy oppose our advance after his main position has been breched? By delaying action or by withdrawing to another defensive position?

c. What reserves or reinforcements, infantry and armor, can be committed against our front? Where are they located? How will they be employed? To counterattack? To reinforce units in contact? To organize a rear defensive position?

d. Where are the enemy's main artillery position areas? Strength of each area?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Seventh Army

(1) Visual missions

(a) Surveillance of rail and road nets in following priority:

(1) Rail and road movements leading towards ST DIE (V-4265) from the NE and E, paying particular attention to the MOLSHEIM (V8293) -- SAALES (V-5372) and SELESTAT (V-7962) -- STE MARIE (V-5961) road nets.

(2) Highway 392 between RAON LES LEAU (V-5390) -- CELLES SUR PLAINE (V-4284).

(3) Highway 424 between ST BLAISE (V-5778) -- SENONES (V-4477).

(4) Road nets leading N from GERARDMER (V-3641).

(5) Road and rail movements in the RHINE Valley giving immediate information of troop movements towards the VOSGES Mountains including time, composition and location of movement.

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(b) Maintain surveillance of areas:

(1) ST DIE (V-4265) -- SAALES (V-5372) -- ST BLAISE (V-5778) -- MOUSSEY (V-4781) -- MOYENMOUTIER (V-3975).

(2) WISEMBACH (V-5362) -- ST MARGUERITE (V-4463) -- SAULCY (V-4360) -- FRAIZE (V-4554).

Particular attention to enemy concentration areas and artillery position areas.

b. 100th Inf Div. Aggressive reconnaissance in zone as directed by Div CG; particular attention N flank and NE toward CELLES SUR PLAINE (V4284) and LA PETITE RAON (V-4578).

c. 3d Inf Div. Aggressive reconnaissance as directed by Div CG.

d. 103d Inf Div. Aggressive reconnaissance as directed by Div CG; particular attention to enemy avenues of approach from the RHINE Valley through the LE BONHOMME (V-5452) -- STE MARIE (V-5961) and LUBINE (V-5768) passes.

e. 36th Inf Div. Aggressive reconnaissance to E and SE as directed by Div CG; particular attention to indications of withdrawal.

x. 100th, 3d and 103d Divs will pay particular attention to routes of advance that bypass enemy resistance and suitable terrain for employment of armor.

4. OTHER DETAILS

No change, see Annex No 2 to FO No 7, VI Corps.

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MAJ GEN

OFFICIAL:

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/t/ LANGEVIN
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Initials
18 Nov 44

ANNEX No 3
To
FO 8

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060), FRANCE
181800A November 1944

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ARTILLERY

1. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT:

a. Division Artillery
(1) 3d Inf Div:
Organic: 3 lt Bns, 1 med Bn) - Direct support 3d Inf Div
Atchd : 93d AFA Bn)
(2) 36th Inf Div:
Organic: 3 lt Bns, 1 med Bn - Direct support 36th Inf Div
(3) 100th Inf Div:
Organic: 3 lt Bns, 1 med Bn)-
Atchd : 69th AFA Bn) Direct support 100th Inf Div
(4) 103d Inf Div:
Organic: 3 lt Bns, 1 med Bn - Direct support. Reinforce fires of 3d Inf Div Arty.

b. Corps Artillery
(1) 6th FA Group:
36th FA Bn (155 mm Gun)
634th FA Bn (155mm How)
141st FA Bn (155mm How)
Mission: General Support. Reinforce fires of 3d Inf Div Arty.
(2) 17th FA Group:
977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
Mission: General support. Reinforce fires of 103d Inf Div Arty, counterbattery in zone of 103d Inf Div and 36th Inf Div.
(3) 406th FA Group:
935th FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
938th FA Bn (155mm How)
Mission: General support. Reinforce fires of 100th Inf Div Arty. Maintain liaison with XV Corps Arty.
(4) 35th FA Group:
995th FA Bn (8" How)
194th FA Bn (8" How)
Mission: General support.

2. MOVEMENT.

Corps artillery battalions will institute immediate reconnaissance and preparation for attack position areas coordinated with divisions in whose zones positions are located. Movements will be coordinated with division movements control.

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3. AMMUNITION.

Ammunition allocation for period 14 Nov to 24 Nov "B" scale. 50% of this allotment will be allocated in bulk to divisions. Remainder will be allocated daily by Corps Artillery Hq as situation dictates.

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15 Nov

ANNEX NO 4
TO
FO 8

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060) FRANCE
181800A November 1944

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

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1. a. Annex No 4.
   b. Friendly Troops: Aviation - Annex No 2.

2. Organization of AAA for Combat.

   a. 35th AAA Brigade, atchd:
      (1) 5th AAA Group:

441st AAA AW Bn (SP)	- Support 3d Inf Div
443d AAA AW Bn (SP)	- Support 36th Inf Div
898th AAA AW Bn	- Support 100th Inf Div
534th AAA AW Bn	- Support 103d Inf Div
431st AAA AW Bn	- Support Corps Arty and protect vital areas.

      (2) 91st AAA Group:

62d AAA Gun Bn	- Reinforce Corps Arty and protect vital areas.
72d AAA Gun Bn	- Reinforce Corps Arty and protect vital areas.
216th AAA Gun Bn	- Reinforce Corps Arty and protect vital areas.
439th AAA AW Bn	- Protect Corps Arty, bridges and vital areas.
533d AAA AW Bn (-Btries C,D)	- Protect Corps Arty, bridges and vital areas

3. Missions:

   a. Support main effort by:
      (1) Providing HVY and LT AAA protection for combat troops, Corps vital areas and defiles.
      (2) Establishing a concentrated AW defense of river crossings, bridges and their approaches in the divisional zones of attack. A minimum of one (1) AW battery will be provided by divisional AW battalions for the protection of each division's main line of communications bridge across the MEURTHE R.
      (3) Reinforcing Field Artillery shoots with HVY AAA batteries, these batteries to be employed in FA role as requested by Corps FA. Commander.
      (4) Reinforcing divisional automatic weapons fire with SP mounts, as directed by Div Commanders.

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19 Nov 1944

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060) FRANCE
19 Nov 1944

ANNEX NO 5
TO
FO 8

ENGINEER

1. Corps Engineers assist advance of Corps.
   a. Provide, transport, and install Bailey, heavy ponton and treadway bridging as required.
   b. Relieve Div Engrs of road and vehicle bridge construction and maintenance on MSRs well forward.

2. a. 36th Engr C Regt, less 1 Co, atchd 2 plats Co C 3[illegible]th Engr Sep Bn (w/two 130' DD Bailey Br), and Det 196th Engr DT Co (w/[illegible] Tdwy Br). Constructs one CI 40 crossing in vicinity of ETIVAL-CLAIRE[illegible]ONTAINE, one Cl 40 crossing in vicinity of ST MICHEL-SURMEURTHE. If required, constructs one Cl 40 crossing at and clears MSR through RAON L'ETAPE. In addition, provides and constructs Bailey or Tdwy bridges as required by CGs of 3d and 103d Inf Divs in Div zones. Maintains MSRs forward in the zones of the 3d and 103d Inf Divs.
   b. 1 Co 36th Engr C Regt, atchd, Det 831st DUKW Co (w/130' DD Bailey Br), and Det 196th Engr DT Co (w/135' Tdwy Br), supports 100th Inf Div. Bridging will be committed on order of CG 100th Div.
   c. 48th Engr C Bn, (less 1 Co), if required, constructs on Cl 40 crossing at and clears MSR through ST DIE.
   d. 1 Co 48th Engr C Bn, atchd Det 3340th DUKW co (w/130' DD Bailey Br), and Det 196th Engr DT Co (w/135' Ml Tdwy Br), supports 36th Inf Div. Bridging will be committed on order CG 36th Inf Div.
   e. 1553d Engr Hv Pon Bn, transports, and assists in construction of Heavy Ponton bridge as required by CO 36th Engr C Regt.
   f. Survey Plat 661st Engr Topo Co, furnish trig control in Corps area as required. Perform forward engr ran.

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VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060), FRANCE
19 November 1944

ANNEX NO 6
TO
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AIR

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1. Prior to D-Day:
   a. Close Support:
      (1) Close in support will be intensified, priority to 100th Inf Div.
      (2) Aircraft available for targets of opportunity on call.
      (3) Scheduled missions will be diverted to emergency targets of opportunity.
      (4) "Horsefly" and arty smoke shells will be used to mark targets.
   b. General Support:
      (1) Attacks on known enemy installations and communications targets. See Incls #2.
   c. Armed Recn:
      (1) Requested as needed on following routes:
      CIREY (V4298) - BADONVILLER (V3889)- RAON L'ETAPE (V3479)
      MOYENMOUTIER (V3776) - SAALES (V5372) - ST BLAISE (V5879)
      ST DIE (V4165) - ST MARIE (V5861) - SELESTAT (V7862)
      ST DIE (V4165) - FRAIZE (V4554) - COLMAR (V7242) - MUNSTER (V5538)
      STRASBOURG (V0000) - ST DIE (V4165)
      SELESTAT (V7862) - SAALES (V5372) - ST DIE (V4165)

2. D-Day:
   a. Close Support:
      (1) Intense F/B attacks on enemy strong points, troop concentrations and gun positions, priority to 3d Inf Div. See Incls #1.
      (2) Targets will be attacked on call from Divs.
      (3) Aircraft availale for targets of opportunity on call.
      (4) Scheduled missions will be diverted to targets of opportunity.
      (5) "Horsefly" and arty smoke shells will be used to mark targets.
      (6) Attacking flights will reconnoiter following routes after bombings:
      RAON L'ETAPE (V3479) - RAON LES LAU (V5390) - BAREMBACH (V6287)
      MOYENMOUTIER (V3776) - MOUSSEY (V4781) - ST BLAISE (V5879)
      MOYENMOUTIER (V3776) - SAALES (V5372) - ST DIE (V4165)
      ST MARIE (V5861) - BAN DE LAVELINE (V5061) - ST DIE (V4165)
      GERARDMER (V4642) - ANOULD (V4154) - BAN DE LAVELINE (V5061)
   b. General Support:
      (1) Attacks on known enemy gun positions, ammunition dumps, communications targets and supply installations. Priority list of targets - Incls #2.
      (2) Bombing of communications targets well beyond the Corps zone will be carried out in accordance with Seventh Army overall plan.
   c. Armed Recn: Will be requested as needed on the following routes:
      CIREY (V4298) - BADONVILLER (V3889) - RAON L'ETAPE (V3479)
      BAREMBACH (V6287) - RAON LES LAU (V5390) - RAON L'ETAPE (V3479)
      STRASBOURG (V0000) - ST BLAISE (V5979) - MOYENMOUTIER (V3776)
      STRASBOURG (V0000) - SAALES (V5372) - ST DIE (V4165)
      STRASBOURG (V0000) - SELESTAT (V7862) - ST MARIE (V5861) - ST DIE
      SELESTAT (V7862) - COLMAR (V7242) - FRAIZE (V4554) - ST DIE (V4165)
      SELESTAT (V7862) - SAALES (V5372) - ST DIE (V4165)
      COLMAR (V7242) - MUNSTER (V5538) - GERARDMER (V4642)
      GERARDMER (V4642) - ANOULD (V4154) - ST DIE (V4165)
      MULHOUSE (V6906) - GUEBWILLER (V6123) - GERARDMER (V3642)
      MULHOUSE (V6906) - THANN (V5213) - GERARDMER (V3642)
   d. Fighter Cover: Maximum fighter cover will be provided during daylight hours for protection of Air OPs and ground troops against enemy A/C.

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3. After D-Day:

a. Close Support:

(1) Beginning at 0800A on D plus 1, and every 30 mins thereafter, 12 A/C will arrive in VI Corps zone, circle for 30 mins and if no suitable target can be given will go on to attack an alternate target.

(2) Known enemy locations other than targets of opportunity will be called in to VI Corps G-3 Air. Scheduled circling flights will be briefed on these targets as alternates in addition to general support alternates.

(3) Any scheduled mission will be diverted to targets of opportunity.

(4) "Horsefly" and arty smoke shells will be used to mark targets when needed.

b. General Support: Attack will be continued on known rear area installations and communications targets.

c. Armed Recn: Surveillance will be maintained on routes listed in par 2 c, priority to routes in zone of main effort.

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Incls - 1 - Close Support D-Day
2.- General Support Targets.

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Incls #1
To
Annex #6
To
FO 8

CLOSE SUPPORT D-DAY

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Mission	Time*	Target Description and Coordinates	A/C	Bombs	Remarks
1		Strong Point V370755	12	Blaze - 50% Frag - 50%	
2		Strong Point V368752	12	"	
3		Strong Point V369743	12	"	
4		Strong PointV368737	12	"	
5		Strong Point V377727	12	"	
6		Strong Point V378747	12	"	
7		Troop Concentration V383739	12	"	
8		Troop Concentration V388743	12	"	
9		Strong Point (HURBACHE) V406727	12	"	

*-Schedule to be coordinated with 3d Inf Div as ground attack progresses

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Incls #2
To
Annex #6
To
FO 8

General Support Targets

Priority	Target Description	Coordinates
1	RR Bridge	V731914
2	Rail Cut	V739650
3	Rail Cut	V600616
4	Road Cut	V488408
5	Road Cut	V469405
6	Detraining Point	V481631
7	Gas & Ammo Dump	V448643
8	Barracks & Storage	V428648
9	Large Ammo Dump	V381434
10	Gas & Ammo Dump	V727928
11	Motor Pool	V457608 to V459609
12	Ammo & Ration Dump	V514678 & V532724
13	Stores	V6184
14	Supply Dump	V534688
15	Ammo Dump	V573734
16	Engr Bridge Equipment Dump	V847372 - V852372 & V849364
17	Food Dump	V492628
18	Div Ammo & Ration Dump	V611869
19	Ration & Clothing Dump	V4363
20	Co CP	V411578

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ANNEX NO 7
TO
FO 8

VI CORPS
GRANDVILLERS (V2060), FRANCE
181800A November 1944

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OPERATION "THUNDER"

1. MISSION.

To simulate preparation for an attck toward FRAIZE (V4554) from the area CORCIEUX (V3652), LE PAIRE (V3759), BIFFONTAINE (V3057) in order to:

a. Deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main Corps effort.
b. Influence the moving and committing of enemy reserves.

2. a. 45th Inf Div: (With concurrence CG Seventh Army)
(1) Simulate concentration of division area LA CHAPPELLE (V2954) - BIFFONTAINE (V3057) - BELMONT (V2758). Reconnaissance parties to operate in area 19 Nov. Assembly areas chosen will be marked with unit signs.
(2) Reconnaissance parties will visit 36th Inf Div command installations in area N of E-W line thru CORCIEUX (V3652) on 19 Nov.
(3) Dummy radio net to be opened on 20 Nov using division call signs and frequencies.

b. 36th Inf Div:
(1) Increase aggressive patrol action on 19-20 Nov pushing troops forward to hold all ground found unoccupied.
(2) On afternoon 19 Nov register mortars, using smoke, on all known and suspected enemy positions along front N of CORCIEUX.
(3) On 19-20 Nov increase motor traffic during daylight hours on roads: BRUYERES (V2457) - LA HOUSSIERE (V3455) - LA CHAPPELLE (V2954) - CORCIEUX (V3652) and LAVELINE (V2754) - GRANGES (V3049).

c. 3d Inf Div:
(1) Movement of 3d Inf Div to new area to be made under cover of darkness except for small reconnaissance parties.

d. VI Corps Artillery:
(1) Simulate the concentration of Corps and 45th Inf Div Arty under control of the Corps Arty Commander in the general area indicated in par 1 above. Registrations from several different locations to be made by use of moving guns. Increase Cub plane activity in 36th Inf Div sector using 45th Inf Div Cubs.
(2) New gun positions will be thoroughly camouflaged prior to occupation. Movement of Corps and 3d Inf Div Arty to new positions will be under cover of darkness.
(3) Dummy guns will be left in old positions.

e. Air:
(1) Fighter-bomber and Armed Rcn missions to be flown in FRAIZE (V4554) - ANOULD (V4254) area on 19-20 Nov.

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Seventh Army	1-3	C/S	14
II Fr Corps	4	G-2	15
XV Corps	5	G-3	16
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36th Inf Div	8-9	Sig	18
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Hq VI Corps Arty	12	CG File	20
CG	13		

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Initials
19 Nov 19

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U.S. ARMY

191300A Nov 1944

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OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION)
:
NUMBER . . . . . 9)

1. Par 3 b, FO 8, this headquarters dated 181800A Nov, is amended to read as follows:

"b. 3d Inf Div, atchd:
(1) Attack at 200645A Nov, seize bridgehead across MEURTHE R.
(2) Advance to NE on axis SAALES (V5372) - STRASBOURG."

2. Missions of other units remain unchanged.

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Initials
19 Nov 44

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

VI CORPS COMBAT TROOP LIST

191200A Nov 44

Hq & Hq Co VI Corps

3d Inf Div
- 7th Inf - 10th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 15th Inf - 39th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 30th Inf - 41st FA Bn (105mm How)
- 9th FA Bn (155mm How)
- 10th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - 93d Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
  - 756th Tk Bn (-Co B) (75 and 76mm Guns)
  - 601st TD Bn (-Co C) (3" Gun SP)
  - 3d Cml Bn (Mtz) (-Cos B,C) (4.2" Mort)

36th Inf Div
- 141st Inf - 131st FA Bn (105mm How)
- 142d Inf - 132d FA Bn (105mm How)
- 143d Inf - 133d FA Bn (105mm How)
- 155th FA Bn (155mm How)
- 111th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - 753d Tk Bn (-Co A, 1 Plat Co D) (75 and 76mm Guns)
  - 636th TD Bn (-Co B, 1 Plat Rcn Co) (3" Gun SP)
  - Co D 83d Cml Bn (4.2" Mort)

100th Inf Div
- 397th Inf - 374th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 398th Inf - 375th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 399th Inf - 925th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 373d FA Bn (155mm How)
- 325th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - 69th Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
  - 117th Cav Rcn Sq
  - Co A, Plat Co D 753d Tk Bn (75 and 76mm Guns)
  - Co B, Plat Rcn Co 636th TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
  - 83d Cml Bn (-Cos B,D) (4.2" Mort)

103d Inf Div
- 409th Inf - 382d FA Bn (105mm How)
- 410th Inf - 383d FA Bn (105mm How)
- 411th Inf - 928th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 384th FA Bn (155mm How)
- 328th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - Co B 756th Tk Bn (75 and 76mm Guns)
  - Co C 601st TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
  - Cos B,C 3d Cml Bn (4.2" Mort)

*Atchd on arrival

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CCA 14th Armd Div
- 25th Tk Bn (75 and 76mm Guns)
- 48th Tk Bn (75 and 76mm Guns)
- 62d Armd Inf Bn
- 500th Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
- Tr B 94th Cav Rcn Sq (mecz)
- Co C 125th Armd Engr Bn

Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty
- 2d FA Gp
- 2d FA Obsn Bn
- Hq & Hq Btry 35th FA Gp
  - 995th FA Bn (8" How)
  - 194th FA Bn (8" How)
- Hq & Hq Btry 6th FA Gp
  - 36th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
  - 634th FA Bn (155mm How)
  - 141st FA Bn (155mm How)
- Hq & Hq Btry 17th FA Gp
  - 977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
- Hq & Hq Btry 405th FA Gp
  - 935th FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
  - 938th FA Bn (155mm How)

Hq & Hq Btry & AAAOD 35th AAA Brig
- Hq & Hq Btry 91st AAA Gp
  - 62d AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
  - 72d AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
  - 216th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
  - 439th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
  - 533d AAA AW Bn (-Btries C,D) (40mm Gun)
- Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp
  - *431st AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
  - 441st AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP) (Supporting 3d Inf Div)
  - 443d AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP) (Supporting 36th Inf Div)
  - 534th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun) (Supporting 103d Inf Div)
  - 898th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun) (Supporting 100th Inf Div)

Hq & Hq Co 1st Armd Gp

Engr
- 36th Engr C Regt
- 48th Engr C Bn

Sig
- 57th Sig Bn
- 72d Sig Co (Spec)

*781st Tk Bn (75 and 76mm Guns)
*824th TD Bn (3" Gun Towed)

VI Corps Unit atchd to XV Corps
- Co B 83d Cml Bn (4.2" Mort)

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HQ VI CORPS
DISPOSITIONS II CORPS
1024004 NOV 1944
MAP REF
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
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
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CALENDAR OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS
IN PREPARATION FOR VI CORPS LANDING IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

VI Corps relieved by IV Corps	11 June
VI Corps Hq move to ROME	11 June
First visit of CG and Gen Staff to ALGIERS (Return with first Army Outline Plan)	16-18 June
3d Inf Div move from ROME to POZZUOLI	19 June
45th Inf Div move from ROME to SALERNO	22 June
36th Inf Div move from ROME to [illegible]	4 July
Chief of Staff and Hq Comdt move to [illegible]	20 June
VI Corps Hq move to NAPLES	23 June
Arrival 3d Inf Div Planning Staff at Blockhouse	25 June
Arrival 45th Inf Div Planning Staff at Blockhouse	26 June
Arrival 36th Inf Div Planning Staff at Blockhouse	27 June
Arrival 3d Inf Div Naval Component at Blockhouse (Rear Admiral LOWRY)	29 June
Arrival 45th Inf Div Naval Component at Blockhouse (Rear Admiral MOON)	30 June
Arrival 36th Inf Div Naval Component at Blockhouse (Rear Admiral RODGERS)	30 June
3d Inf Div Amphib training	24 June - 14 July
45th Inf Div Amphib training	27 June - 13 July
36th Inf Div Amphib training	8 July - 22 July
VI Corps Training Directive issued	24 June
Second Army Outline Plan received	26 June
General TRUSCOTT's letter to General PATCH concerning Army Outline Plan	27 June
General PATCH's reply to General TRUSCOTT's letter	28 June
Second visit of CG and Gen Staff to ALGIERS	29 June - 1 July
First VI Corps Outline Plan issued	2 July
First VI Corps Allocation of craft issued	2 July
Final Corps Outline Plan issued	15 July
First briefing by CG [illegible]	16 July
CG inspection of CC SUDRE at ORAN	17 July - 18 July
Naval gunfire plans completed	29 July
Army Field Order received	30 July
Air Plan Completed	3 August
VI Corps Field Order issued	4 August
3d Inf Div rehearsal (GAETA)	31 July
45th Inf Div rehearsal (SALERNO)	7 August
36th Inf Div rehearsal (GAETA)	7 August
Naval Task Force Commander's final briefing (Vice Admiral HEWITT)	6 August
CG's final briefing	8 August
VI Corps Hq embarks:	
USS SANTA ROSA	9 August
USS BENTELOUSE	9 August
USS BARNETT	9 August
USS CATOCTIN	9 August

Note: CG and party boarded USS CATOCTIN on evening 12 August.

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BATTLE EXPERIENCES, COORDINATION OF VARIOUS ARMS

Index of Inclosures

1. Directive Headquarters Seventh Army, 5 November 1944.

2. Field Order #7, Headquarters VI Corps with:
   Annex #1, Operations overlay.
   Annex #2, Intelligence.
   Annex #3, Air.

3. Outline Plan A, Headquarters VI Corps with:
   Annex #1, Operations overlay.

4. Outline Plan B, Headquarters VI Corps with:
   Annex #1, Operations overlay.

5. Outline Plan C, Headquarters VI Corps with:
   Annex #1, Operations overlay.

6. Field Order #8, Headquarters VI Corps with:
   Annex #1, Operations overlay.
   Annex #2, Intelligence.
   Annex #3, Artillery.
   Annex #4, AAA.
   Annex #5, Engineer.
   Annex #6, Air.
   Annex #7, Operation "Thunder".

7. Operations Instruction #9, Headquarters VI Corps, 19 November 1944.

8. VI Corps Combat Troop List, 19 November 1944.

9. VI Corps Situation, 10 November 1944.

10. VI Corps Situation, 19 November 1944.

11. VI Corps Situation, 23 November 1944.

12. Calendar of principal events in preparation for VI Corps landing in Southern France.

13. Field Order #1, Headquarters VI Corps. (At present in files of General Board USFET).

14. Task Force BUTLER.

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7 Nov 44

VI Corps
GRANDVILLERS (V2060), FRANCE
7 November 1944

FO 7

Map: FRANCE 1/50,000

1. a. See G-2 Summary, Annex 2.
b. (1) Seventh Army attacks D + 1 to destroy enemy in zone W of the RHINE, and captures STRASBOURG.
(2) XV Corps attacks D day; captures and secures SARREBOURG, forces SAVERNE Gap prepared to exploit E of the VOSGES.
(3) XII TAC: See Annex 3, Air.

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2. VI Corps continues present operations. Not later than D + 2 attacks on the axis ST DIE - STRASBOURG. See Overlay.

3. a. 3d Inf Div, attached:
756th Tk Bn
601st TD Bn
3d Cml Bn (-Co C)
Det 168th Cml Co (SG)
(1) Continue action to clear enemy from present zone W of the MEURTHE and TAINTRUX Rivers by 10 Nov.
(2) Upon completion of relief in R of present zone by 103d Inf Div, assemble not less than two infantry regiments in the ST HELENE area for rehabilitation and objective training, maintaining front in zone with minimum force.
(3) Be prepared to attack, on Corps order, by 20 Nov to seize a bridgehead across the MEURTHE River vic SAN MICHEL and continue the advance in zone, or to exploit the attack of the 100th Inf Div. (Overlay)

b. 36th Inf Div, attached:
753d Tk Bn (-Co A, 1 Plat Co D)
636th TD Bn (-Co B, 1 Plat Recn Co)
Co C 3d Cml Bn, Co D 83d Cml Bn
(1) Continue present action to clear enemy from FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP in zone.
(2) Be prepared to execute OI #5, this Hq dated 011700A Nov 44, on Corps order by 13 Nov.
(3) Protect R (S) flank of Corps.
(4) Execute extensive aggressive patrols on the S flank. Follow up any hostile withdrawal.
(5) Maintain contact with adjacent elements on R.

c. 45th Inf Div, attached:
191st Tk Bn
645th TD Bn
106th AAA AW Bn
(1) Continue present action. Clear enemy from zone W of the MEURTHE River by 7 Nov.
(2) Upon completion of relief by 100th Inf Div on 9 Nov, assemble in BAINS LES BAINS area under Army control. Complete assembly not later than 1200A 10 Nov.

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d. 100th Inf Div, attached:
117th Cav Recn Sq
Co A 753d Tk Bn
Plat Co D 753d Tk Bn
Co B 636th TD Bn
1 Plat Recn Co 636th TD Bn
83d Cml Bn (-Cos B, D)

[redacted]

(1) Seize high ground N of RAON L'ETAPE. Prepare to continue advance, on Corps order, by 15 Nov to the E on the axis RAON L'ETAPE - LA PETITE RAON, or to the NE on the axis RAON L'ETAPE - BOINVILLE or to assist the attack of the 3d Inf Div by seizing high ground between RAON L'ETAPE and MOYENMOUTIER. (overlay)

(2) Protect the L (N) flank of the Corps.

e. 103d Inf Div (attachments to be designated later):

(1) Relieve elements of the 3d and 36th Inf Divs in zone by 130600A Nov.

(2) Be prepared to attack, on Corps order, by 15 Nov, to seize and hold high ground SW of ST DIE. (Overlay)

(3) Be prepared to attack ST DIE or to follow attack of 3d Inf Div across MEURTHE River.

f. Corps Artillery:

(1) 3d Inf Div:

(a) Organic artillery - No change in mission.

(b) 69th AFA Bn relieved from attachment to 3d Inf Div and attached 100th Inf Div effective 1800A 8 Nov.

(2) 36th Inf Div:

(a) Organic artillery - No change.

(b) Attached - 93d AFA Bn.

(3) 100th Inf Div:

(a) Organic artillery - Occupy positions to support division action.

(b) 69th AFA Bn attached 100th Inf Div effective 1800A 8 Nov.

(4) 103d Inf Div:

(a) Organic artillery - Occupy positions in zone upon arrival to support division attack.

(5) Corps Artillery:

(a) 6th FA Gp:

36th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
634th FA Bn (155mm How)
Mission - General support. Reinforce fires of 3d Inf Div Arty and 103d Inf Div Arty.

(b) 17th FA Gp:

141st FA Bn (155mm How)
977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
Mission - General support. Reinforce fires of 36th Inf Div Arty. Coordinate with II Fr Corps Arty.

(c) 405th FA Gp:

935th FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
938th FA Bn (155mm How)
Mission - General support. Reinforce fires of 100th Inf Div Arty. Establish liaison with XV Corps Arty.

(d) 35th FA Gp:

995th FA Bn (8" How) - General support.
194th FA Bn (8" How) - General support.

(e) Division Artilleries will provide basic fire plan and fires of all reinforcing arty will be coordinated with these plans.

g. 35th AAA Brigade, attached:

(1) 5th AAA Gp:

441st AAA AW Bn (SP) - support 3d Inf Div
443d AAA AW Bn (SP) - support 36th Inf Div
898th AAA AW Bn - support 100th Inf Div
534th AAA AW Bn - support 103d Inf Div
One AAA AW Bn - support Corps Arty and protect vital areas

(2) 91st AAA Gp:

72d AAA Gun Bn - reinforce Corps Arty and protect vital areas
216th AAA Gun Bn - reinforce Corps Arty and protect vital areas
Btries A and C, 865th AAA AW Bn - protect bridges and vital areas

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(3) Support main effort by:
(a) Providing Hvy and Lt AAA protection for combat troops, Corps vital areas, defiles and bridges.
(b) Reinforcing Field Artillery shoots with Hvy AAA Btries, these btries to be employed in FA role as requested by Corps FA Comdr.
(c) Reinforcing divisional automatic weapons fire with SP mounts, as directed by Div Comdr.

h. 1st Armored Group:
Continue present mission.

i. 36th Engr C Regt:
36th Engr C Regt supports 3d and 100th Inf Divs. One 130' D/D Bailey bridge, one 240' Treadway bridge, and adequate inf support equipment will be provided in the zone of attack of each division.

j. 48th Engr C Bn:
Supports 36th Inf Div.

x. (1) Contact from R to L.
(2) Every effort will be directed toward the capture of road and rail bridges intact.
(3) Troops will be prepared on order to display yellow smoke to indicate their presence to friendly aircraft.

4. Administration: No change.

5. a. Axis of Signal Communication:
(1) VI Corps - Operations Overlay.
(2) Divisions - To be reported.
b. CPs: Overlay.

BROOKS
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL

/s/ Connor
CONNOR
Asst G-3

3 ANNEXES: 1. - Operations Overlay (2 sheets)
2. - Intelligence
3. - Air

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SHEET 1 of 2

OPN OVERLAY
TO ACCOMPANY FO # 7
VI CORPS
7 NOV 44
MAP REF:
FRANCE 1/50,000

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FRONT LINE
NOV 4

BACCARAT

100TH DIV CLEAR
PRIOR TO NOV 15

RAON L'ETAPE

20
80

50
80

XV
VI

AREA TO BE CLEARED
BY 45TH DIV PRIOR
TO NOV 7TH

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XX
45

100
XX
3

00
XX
3

LA SALLE
XXX

MEURTHE R.

3
XX
103

ST DIE

AREA TO BE CLEARED
BY 3d DIV PRIOR
TO NOV 10TH

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45
XX
3

DECLASSIFIED

45
XY
3

XX
3

XXX
VI

XX
36

AREA TO BE CLEARED BY 3d DIV PRIOR TO NOV 10TH

3
XX
36

103d DIV TO ATTACK AND CLEAR COMMENCING ON CORPS ORDER

103
XX
35

AREA TO BE CLEARED BY 36TH DIV PRIOR TO NOV 10TH

FRAIZE

36TH DIV TO ATTACK AND CLEAR COMMENCING NOV 13TH

20
V
50

50
V
60

VI
XXX
II FR

FIRST FR
SEVENTH.
XXXX

GERARDMER

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SHEET 2 OF 2.

OPN OVERLAY
TO ACCOMPANY FO #7
VI CORPS
7 NOV 44

MAP REF:
FRANCE 1/50,000

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Maj Gen

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Although Task Force BUTLER was not set up in the Corps Field Order for Operation DRAGOON (ANVIL) and therefore is not discussed in connection with coordination in planning of the SOUTHERN FRANCE assault, no study of the landing would be complete without reference to the history of this force. In the latter stages of the planning phase of the operation, it became obvious that a strong and successful amphibious assault might result in such disorganization of enemy forces that a plan of vigorous pursuit could be advantageously initiated. Accordingly the Corps Commander made preliminary plans for the establishment of a highly mobile pursuit force. Set-up as commander was Brigadier General Frederick B. Butler, Assistant to the Corps Commander, who proceeded to organize a staff around that of the 117th Cav Ren Sq (Mecz) (whose reinforced ren troops were attached to the three divisions for the landings), supplemented by S-2, S-3, S-4 and Signal personnel provided by Corps. During the voyage from NAPLES to SOUTHERN FRANCE this provisional headquarters prepared three tentative plans contemplating the use of the reconnaissance squadron reinforced by motorized infantry and other elements, although the exact composition of the force could not be determined until the location and nature of its employment became known. Plans envisioned: (1) movement North from the beach area on the ROUTE NAPOLEON toward GRENOBLE, (2) movement West toward AIX, and (3) movement Northwest in the direction of RIEZ.

On D/ 1 the success of the landings indicated that the preparations for the employment of this mobile unit were justified. A task force was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of LE MUY, West of ST RAPHAEL, on 17 August, prepared to initiate an advance North on the ROUTE NAPOLEON early 18 August. In addition to the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), the force consisted of 2d Battalion 143d Infantry (36th Infantry Division; motorized by trucks of Corps and the divisions), 69th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 753d Tank Battalion (-2 Companies), a company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company "F" 344th Engineer GS Regiment. Early on the morning of 18 August the force commenced movement to the North, passing through elements of the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions near DRAGUIGNAN. By that evening the bulk of the force was in the vicinity of RIEZ, a road distance of over 100 miles from LE MUY, and the cavalry squadron was continuing reconnaissance in advance to the West and Northwest. The following day while a small force secured a bridge across the DURANCE River near MONTFORT, the bulk of the unit continued North on the ROUTE NAPOLEON, establishing its CP at SISTERON that night. On 20 August separate columns reached LES OMERGUES and ST JULIEN, and captured GAP. In the first three days of its existance Task Force BUTLER had advanced some 200 miles over the roads.

By this time the vigor and speed of the entire Corps advance had forced the enemy to initiate a withdrawal to the North in the RHONE Valley. On the evening of 20 August General BUTLER received orders to move at daylight the following morning with all possible speed to MONTELIMAR, a town on the east bank of the RHONE, approximately 100 miles north of MARSEILLE, to block all routes of withdrawal up the RHONE Valley. He was instructed that the 36th Infantry Division would follow with the same mission. Accordingly on 21 August Task Force BUTLER commenced movement to the West. At 1000S hours that morning the force was attached to the 36th Infantry Division. By noon of 22 August the main elements of the force were assembled in the vicinity of LIVRON, about 25 miles north of MONTELIMAR. At the same time the 36th Infantry Division was being relieved on the right flank of the Corps sector by the 1st Airborne Task Force under Seventh Army command and was moving Northwest toward LIVRON. To the Southwest the 3d Infantry Division captured AIX on 21 August, and elements of the French Army "B" were attacking TOULON and approaching MARSEILLE.

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From LIVRON Task Force BUTLER moved South to the vicinity of MONTELIMAR, harassing and delaying German columns moving north from the RHONE delta area. The force took part with the 36th Infantry Division in the battle in the vicinity of MONTELIMAR, assisting in blocking the northward enemy retreat while the 3d Infantry Division pressed the attack from the South. Not only was the enemy caught in a pincer by ground action but the blocking of the East bank highway resulted in extremely profitable targets for friendly air action, and total losses to the German Nineteenth Army in equipment, animals and personnel were tremendous.

With some changes in make-up, Task Force BUTLER continued in existence under the 36th Infantry Division until approximately the end of August when it was disbanded. Although the active life of the Task Force was short, its ground-covering capabilities and speed ofmovement were spectacular. The employment of the force was in accordance with classic concepts and the results obtained, culminating in delaying the withdrawal of an important enemy force until major friendly units could close with it, make of Task Force BUTLER an outstanding example of successful pursuit action.

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